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THE NORTH DAKOTA EQUITY FOR TORTFEASORS
STRUGGLE -Judicial Action vs. Legislative Over-Reaction
LARRY KRAFT*
I. INTRODUCTION
Tort litigation has experienced unprecedented growth during
the last ten years. Tortfeasors, many only recently immune or
impervious to suit, are now regularly subjected to innovative
substantive and procedural theories yielding seven figure damage
awards. Not surprisingly, potential defendants are expressing
dissatisfaction with the system. A few years ago the most vocal and
most organized group was the medical profession. Today,
however, the complaints of all others are overshadowed by those of
well-organized groups of product manufacturers.
The common denominator on all lists of complaints is that the
uncertainty of the tort system has created a rate-making nightmare
for insurance companies. After decades of extracting moderate
liability insurance premiums from whole industries by raising the
spectre of the occasional lawsuit, insurance companies are finding
that they may have underestimated the scope of their salespersons'
self-fulfilling prophecy. To guarantee the insurer's continued
existence, current rate structures have been radically modified
*Professor of Law, University of North Dakota School of' Law: J.D., University of North
Dakota, 1964; L.,. M., University ofTexas, 1970.
1. See Nelson, Products Liability: New Directions and Practical Approaches, 2 CoRP. L. REV. 179
(1979).
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upward. The resulting high cost of liability insurance has,
according to some,1 created a crisis for product sellers.2
Ironically, it is the phenomenal success of a prior generation of
insurance salespersons that is the most often-cited explanation for
the tort explosion. An unending Succession of court opinions list the
prevalence of insurance as a primary reason for expanding
liability,3 thereby achieving the social goal of spreading the cost of
injuries. Moreover, modern day juries are much more inclined
than were their predecessors to assume the presence of liability
insurance. They, too, have been sold on the importance of
insurance.
Products liability tort defendants, as well as tort defendants in
general, have reason to complain. They are not criminals, as were
tortfeasors in earlier times; yet detritus of the criminal foundation
upon which early tort law developed continues to impede equitable
treatment. Nor should the tort system foist upon product sellers
social responsibilities not created by their own conduct; that is
exactly what happens, however, when product sellers are required
to pay for consumer injuries caused by consumers' culpable
conduct.
Evidence of' the tort system's inclination to excise these and
other impediments to the normal and healthy development of tort
law is mounting. This article will emphasize recent action of the
Supreme Court of North Dakota which revolutionizes the
contribution and indemnity rules applicable to joint tortfeasors.
There is every indication that, given the opportunity, the court
would make other equitable revisions. Several possible revisions
are discussed in this article.
The adversary approach to the resolution of private conflicts is
slow, because it assures microscopic analysis and objective
consideration of all aspects of the conflict tinder study.
Unfortunately for insurers, litigation of the question of whether
2.
"Product seller" means an), person or entity, inchlding a manufactLrer, wholesaler,
distribluor, or retailer, who is engaged in the buisiness of selling such prodLcts,
whether the sale is resale, or for use or consomption. The term "product seller" also
incldes lessors or bailors of prodicts who are engaged in the business of leasing or
bailmnent of products.
DR,sr UNIFORM PRODUCT LI.ttITY LAW § 102 (1), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 2996, 2997 (1979)-
[hereinafter U.P.L.L.J.
3. See, e.g., Coulter v. Superior Court of San MateoCounty, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534, __, 577 P.2d
669, 674 (Cal. 1978) (-availability, cost and prevalence of insurance'); Rowland v. Christian, 69
Cal. 2d 108, 113, 70 Cal. Rstr. 97. 100, 443 P.2d 561 564 (1968)("availability, cost. and irv'snctice
of insuirance"); Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 245 N.E.2d 192, 193-94
(1969) ("instirance effectively removes the arguiment favoring contined family harmony as a basis
lir prohibiting this suit").
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1979 products liability defendants were unjustly enriched when
charged bargain rates for liability insurance in the past has not yet
even commenced. Actions involving the real parties in interest,
however, are before every high court in the country. In what is for
the evolution of law a very short time, the judiciary would eliminate
the deficiencies in the tort system that now are the cause of the
injustices suffered by the product liability tortfeasor.
An ominous threat, however, seems certain to adversely affect,
if not destroy, the fine balance being struck between competing
interests. Powerful and angry forces have successfully bullied
confused legislatures into passing ill-considered and irresponsible
self-serving legislation. If left unchecked, a chaotic situation that
will take the judiciary and legislature years to untangle is certain to
follow. Examples of this type of legislation are discussed herein.
This article then, is about the orderly evolution of several tort
principles. The major focus is on Bartels v. City of Williston,4
unquestionably the most significant multiple-defendant case ever
decided by the North Dakota Supreme Court. Also discussed are
two bills passed by the 1979 North Dakota legislature which
threaten to impede the progress of many developments which
would logically flow from the Bartels decision.
II. BARTELS V. CITY OF WILLISTON
A. BACKGROUND
Viewed from a historical perspective, 5 the common law "no
contribution among joint tortfeasors" rule is acceptable. Joint
tortfeasors were wrongdoers who intentionally caused injury or
damage, and the judicial system was unavailable as a forum for
adjudicating disputes betweeen parties considered akin to
criminals. A wronged plaintiff could proceed to judgment against
any one or more of the tortfeasors of his choice, and the tortfeasor
who satisfied the judgment was without recourse against his
partners.
English law limited the rule to willful and intentional
tortfeasors, 6 as did the early American cases. Americans soon,
4. 276 N.V.2d 113 (N.I). 1979).
5. See generaly XV. PROSSFR, LA WOF 1 ORTS § 50 (4th ed. 1971): Leflar. Contribution and Indemnib
,
Betieen Torfeasors. 81 U. PA. L. Rcs-. 130 (1932). See also the articles cited note 7 infra.
6. Even where the common law prohibition against contribution has been modified,
contribution between intentional wrongdoers is not allowed. See, e.g., North Dakota Century Code
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however, extended the rule to include simple negligence. This
extension has been universally criticized. 7 Prosser, For example, has
noted:
There is [an] obvious lack of sense and Justice in a rifle
which permits the entire burden of a loss, for which two
defendants were equally, unintentionally responsible, to
be shouldered onto one alone, according to the accident of
a successful levy of execution, the existence of liability
insurance, the plainti,,ff's whim or spite, or his collusion
with the other wrongdoer, while the latter goes scotfree.81
A substantial majority ofjtrisdictions have responded to these
concerns by modifying the common law rule." As one state supreme
court recently put it:
We are of the opinion that there is no valid. reason for
the continued existence of the no-contribution rule and
many compelling arguments against it....
. . . Where this court has created a rifle or doctrine
which, under present conditions, we consider tnsotund
and unjust, we have not only the power, but the duty, to
modify or abolish it. I0
Although recognizing the inequities associated with the no-
contribution rule, some jurisdictions are not willing to modify the
rule, citing difficulty of administration1" or reasoning that modi-
section 32-38-01(3): "There is no right of contribotion in Favor of iny ior(l-i'asor who has
intentionally (willfolly or wantonly) caused or contri, icld to the in.;inry or wrongfl fleath." N.D.
CENT. CorE . 32-38-01 (3) (1976).
7. See, e.g., Appel & Michael, Contribution Among joint Torfeasor. in Illinoi; An Opportunit .for
Legislative and Judicial Cooperation, 10 Loy. Cm. L.J. 169 (1979); Gregory, Contribution Among
Torifeasors: A Uniform Practice, 1938 Wis. i. Rt.v. 365; Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Amon
Tortfeasors, 26 TE-XAS L. Rr.v. 150 (1947); Note, Does Connecticut Comparative Neligence ,Staute Ahrogate
Common Law No-Contribution Rule? 10 CONN. L. R rv. 526 (1978); Noite, Contribution Among.Joint Tort-
feasors, Washington Retains the Common Law Rule Prohibiting Claims.for Contribution Among.Joint Tort-
feasors, 14 GoN:. L. RFV. 495 (1979); Note, North Dakota Contribution Among Torfeaors Act, 38 N.D.L.
REv. 586 (1962); Note, Reconciling Comparative Negligence, Contribution and joint and Several Liability, 34
WASH. & LEF. L. RF.v. 1159 (1977); Comment, Indemnity and Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors, 15
Hous. L. RE.v. 1004(1978).
8. W. PROssER, LA.OF TORTS 5 50 at 307 (footnote omitted) (4th ed. 1971).
9. Recent sorveys of state laws are foond at Note, Does Connecticut Comparative Negligence Statute
Abro.gate Common Law No-Contribution Rule?, 10 CONN. L. RFv. 526, 541-43 nn. 75-79 (1978), and
Note, Contribution Among.Joint Tort-feasors, Washington Retains the Common Law Rule Prohibiting Claims for
Contribution AmongJoint Tort-easors, 14 GON'. L. RFv. 495, 497 n. I1 (1979). Contribstion.
comparative negligence, and strict liability have become so intertwined that no sirvey is accurate for
long. See, e.g., Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Pkge. Mach. Co., 70 Il.2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977),
modified, 70 1ll.2d 16 (1978); Bartels v. City of'Williston, 276 N.W.2d 113 (N.D. 1979).
10. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div, Pkge. Mach. Co., 70 I1. 2d 1, 13-14, 374 N.E.2d 437, 442
(1977).
11. Wenatchee Wenoka Growers Ass'n v. Krack Corp., 89 Wash. 2d 847, 850-52, 576 P.2d
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fication is a legislative function. 12
Assuming a right of contribution is recognized, there remains
the matter of devising a system to apportion damages. There is
little uniformity in the manner in which this has been
accomplished, largely because of diversity in rules of procedure and
the existence of other theories, such as comparative negligence and
strict products liability, which also affect apportionment of
damages. There is also general disagreement as to the manner of
apportionment - should pro-rata shares be determined simply by
an equal division of damages, or should relative fault of the
tortfeasors be considered in determining apportionment of
damages?13
As to this latter concern, the Uniform Contribution Among
Joint Tortfeasors Act did little to encourage uniformity.' 4 In the
1939 version, the Uniform Law Commissioners provided this
option: "[w]hen there is such a disproportion of fault among joint
tortfeasors as to render inequitable an equal distribution among
them of the common liability by contribution, the relative degrees
of fault of the joint tortfeasors shall be considered in determining
their pro rata shares.' 1 5 When the 1939 version was revised in
1955, however, a provision was inserted prohibiting consideration
of relative degrees of fault. 16
North Dakota was one of the states which adopted the 1955
version of the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors
Act.' 7 Section 32-38-02(1) of the North Dakota Century Code pro-
388, 389-91 (1978). Notwithstanding the wide acceptance of the abolition of the common law rule,
the court concluded that an acceptable prototype would be difficult to find given the lack of
uniformity in the contribution practices found in other jurisdictions. Id. at __ , 576 P.2d at 390.
The Washington Supreme Court refused to depart from the no-contribution position in the absence
of some kind of model system of dealing with the many collateral issues such a departure creates.
12. Howard v. Spafford, 132 Vt. 434, 321 A.2d 74, 76 (1974). "We are urged. .. that a re-
laxation of the rule is indicated by. .. [tihe prevalence of atomobile liability insurance . . and our
comparative negligence statute. ... We find neither reason compelling enough to substitute judicial
fiat for legislative action." Id. at 435, 321 A.2d at 75.
13. See W. PROSSER, J. WADE, V. SCHWARTZ, TORTS 385 n.7 (6th ed. 1976) which states the
following:
There is sharp disagreement as to the basis for making division of damages
among the tortfeasors. The majority rule, by analogy to contribution among sureties,
has adopted an equal-division basis - half and half if there are two tortfeasors, by
thirds if there are three, and so on. A growing number of jurisdictions, however, are
deciding to make the division according to the relative fault of the parties. With the
widespread adoption of a comparative negligence principle in substitution for the
common law rule of contributory negligence, this position is expected to become even
more significant. It seems necessary in a state which administers pure comparative
negligence, and the Uniform Contribution Act may be amended to provide for it.
Id.
14. See &enerally V. ScHARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIcENCE § 16.7 (1974).
15. Id. at 261.
16. Id. at 262.
17. The Act was adopted in 1957, and was codified at N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 32-38 (1976). See
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vided that "[i]n determining the pro-rata shares of tort-feasors in
the entire liability. . . [t]heir relative degrees of fault shall not be
considered. "18
The matter of devising a system to apportion damages is
further complicated by releases. At common law the release of one
joint tortfeasor is a release of all joint tortfeasors. The Uniform
Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Acts (1939 and 1955)
modified this rule by allowing the claimant to proceed against non-
released tortfeasors; the 1939 version allowed the non-released
tortfeasor contribution from the released tortfeasor, while the 1955
version did not allow contribution unless the release was not given
in good faith, but by way of collusion. 19
An emerging trend precludes contribution from released
tortfeasors,2 0 instead reducing the claimant's total claim by the
proportionate share attributable to the released tortfeasor. But even
here there is a lack of uniformity, as some .jurisdictions reduce the
claim by the absolute dollar amount received in consideration for
the release, while others reduce the claim by the percentage of fault
of the released tortfeasors.21
Against the backdrop of the problems of apportioning
damages among.joint tortfeasors, and apportioning damages when
one or more joint tortfeasors have been released, the adoption of
comparative negligence by North Dakota has further complicated
the situation. When North Dakota abolished the no-contribution
among joint tortfeasors rule in 1957, the state was still firmly
committed to the all or nothing "contributory negligence bars
recovery" rule. 22 Except for a handful of states, 23 most other
jurisdictions also followed the rule at that time. Shortly thereafter
attacks on the fault system began to mount, 24 resulting in a
stampede toward comparative negligence. In the ten year period
from 1965 to 1975, at least twenty-five jurisdictions, including
North Dakota, turned to comparative negligence. 25
generaly Note, North Dakota Contribution Among Tort/easors Act, 38 N.D.L. REV. 586 (1962).
18. N.D. CENT. CO1E § 32-38-02(1) (1976) (emphasis added). This section has been repealed by
Audicial fiat. See infra notes 34 through 54 and accompanying text.
19. See Comment § 6, Uniform Comparative Fatult Act (1978).
20. For articles concerning this trend, see supra note 7.
21. Id.
22. For discssions of that rtle see James, Contributory Negligence, 62 YALE L..J. 691 (1953);
Bohlen. Contributory Neligence, 21 HARV. L. REv. 233 (1908).
23. One souirce suiggests that in the mid-1960's only six states had a general comparative
negligence system: Arkansas (1955), Georgia (1904), Mississippi (1910), Nebraska (1913), Souith
Dakota (1941) and Wisconsin (1931). W. PROSSER, .. WADE & V. SCHWVARTZ, TORTS 608 (6th ed.
1976).
24. Id., citing R. KEETON & .1. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TI-RAFFIC VICTIM - A
Bi.E PRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965).
25. W. PROSSER,.J. WADE & V. SCH\VART7 TORTS 608 (6th ed. 1976). TheJ jurisdictions are not
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After being chastised by the Supreme Court of North Dakota
for its inaction on the issue,26 the legislature in 1973 adopted the
comparative negligence act which Minnesota had borrowed from
Wisconsin in 1969.27 Obviously overlooked or ignored was the fact
that Minnesota's contribution among joint tortfeasors law was
embodied in its comparative negligence statute. As a result, when
North Dakota adopted the Minnesota statute, including its
contribution provision, a statutory conflict was created with North
Dakota's existing contribution law, embodied in chapter 32-38 of the
North Dakota Century Code. Chapter 32-38 enacted in 1957
specifically prohibited consideration of the relative degrees of fault
of the tortfeasors in determining contribution; 2 the 1973 statute,
codified as section 9-10-07 of the North Dakota Century Code,
however, specifically provides for "contributions to awards.., in
proportion to the percentage of negligence attributable to each"
tortfeasor. 29  Furthermore, chapter 32-38 contained specific
provisions governing the effect of settlement and release on
contributions, 30 while the 1973 statute did not. 3'
B. THE BARTELS CASE
The collision between section 9-10-07 and chapter 32-38 of the
,iniforini in their approach to ctoiirativc negligence. Most ;,trisdictinns adopting comparative
negligence by statute prefer one of the niodified comparative negligence approaches ("not as great
as- or "not greater than"), while those few pirisdictions adopting comparative negligence )v
idicial fiat seen to prefer the "pire" conmparative negligence approach. All approaches are
thoroghlv discussed in V. ScMDART', COMPARATIvE NECICGENCE(1974 & Stipp. 1978).
26. See Krise v. Gullnd, 184 N.W.2d 405, 409(N.D. 1971).
27. The Wisconsin Statute was enacted in 1931. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1966).
Minnesota adopted it in 1969. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West Stpp. 1978). Both statutes have
since been amended. Wisconsin in 1971 and Minnesota in 1978. The text of Minnesota's amended
versio n is fo nd in note 59 infra.
The North Dakota version is found at section 9-10-07 ofthe North Dakota Century Code. That
sectio providts as follows:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his
legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or injury to
person or property, if such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the person
against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in
proportion to the ato, nt of negligence attrihtable to the person recovering. The
court may, and when requested by either party shall, direct the jury to find separate
spc'Lal vt l'icts cetertnining the atnoont of damages and the percentage of negligence
attributable to each party: and the court shall then reduce the amount of such damages
in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering. When
there are two or more persons who are jointly liable, contributions to awards shall be in proportion to
the percentage of negligence attributable to each, provided, however, that each shall remain jointly
and severally liable for the whole award. Upon the request of any party, this section shall be
read by the court to the jury and the attorneys representing the parties may comment
to the t.ry regarding this section.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1976) (Emphasis added).
28. See supra note 18, and accompanying text.
29. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 9-10-07 (1976). For the text of this section, seesupra note 27.
30. N.D CENT. CODE § 32-38-04 (1976). For the text of this section, see infra note 36.
31. N.D. CENT. CooE § 9-10-07 (1976). For the text ofthis section, seesupra note 27.
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North Dakota Century Code was inevitable. A conflict was noted
within months after passage of section 9-10-07; 32 that it took six
years before the .North Dakota Supreme Court was afforded an
opportunity to resolve the conflict 33 can only be attributed to a
caseload proportionate to the state's low population.
Bartels v. City of Williston34 involved a severely injured plaintiff
who had been a passenger in an off-road vehicle that went over a
cliff on land under lease from the city of Williston. The plaintiff
settled with the driver and the driver's insurance company for
$50,000, gave them a release, 35 and subsequently brought an action
in United States District Court against the city of Williston. The
city in turn brought a third-party action against the driver, and the
driver moved for summary judgment, seeking to have the third-
party complaint dismissed. Utilizing North Dakota's recently
adopted rule 47 of the North Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure,
the United States District Court certified questions to the North
Dakota Supreme Court regarding the application of chapter 32-
32. V. SCHWART7, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 16.7 at 262 (1974).
When the 1939 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act was revised in 1955, degree of
fat was abandoned as one of the factors to be considered in apportioning liability. Instead, there
was inserted a provision that 'their relative degrees of falt shall not be considered. " Id. Only two of
the comparative negligence states - Massachusetts and North Dakota - have adopted the 1955
version of the Uniform Act. In North Dakota, this clause appears to have been superseded, at least in
part, by the provision in the comparative negligence statute that "contributions to awards shall be in
proportion to the percentage of negligence attribitable to each." Id.
33. The North Dakota court apparently recognized the existence of the conflict between § 32-38-
02(1) in Saylor v. Halstrom, 239 N.W.2d 276, 282-83 (N.D. 1976), but did not resolve the issue,
presumably because that action arose prior to enactment of§ 9-10-07.
34. 276 N.W.2d 113 (N.D. 1979).
35. Bartels v. City of Williston, 276 N.W.2d 113 (N.D. 1979). [Hereinafter referred to as
Bartels. I
The release was a general release which released [the driver] "from all claims,
demands, actions, judgments, and executions that Releasor ever had, or now has, or
may have, either known or unknown .. " The release further provided that it 'is
intended to cover only the Releasees named herein with respect to the above-described
accident. Releasor expressly reserves all rights, claims, and cauuses of action that he
may have against any other persons, firms, or corporations with respect to the
aforementioned accident.
Id. at 115N.1.
The release terms should be considered in connection with the Pierringer release discussion found
in/ra at notes 49 and 50 and accompanying text.
36. The court in Bartels quoted the following relevant provisions of chapter 32-38 of the Century
Code:
Section 32-38-01. Right to Contribution.
1. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, where two or more persons
become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property or
for the same wrongfil death, there is a right ofcontributtion among them even though
judgment has not been recovered against all or any of them.
2. The right ofcontribution exists only in favor ofa tort-feasor who has paid more
than his pro rata share of the common liability, and his total recovery is limited to the
amont paid by him in excess of his pro rata share. No tort-feasor is compelled to-
make contribttion beyond his own pro rata share of the entire liability.
3. There is no right of contribttion in favor of any tort-feasor who has
intentionally (willfully or wantonly) caused or contributed to the iniry or wrongfid
death.
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3836 and section 9-10-073 7 of the North Dakota Century Code to the
facts in the case. The questions certified to the court, and the
court's responses, were substantially as follows:
1. In an action for negligence. . . does a release
given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in
tort for the same injury. . . discharge the tortfeasor to
whom it is given from all liability for contribution to any
other tortfeasor? (yes).
2. [W]hen determining the right of a tortfeasor to
contribution,. . . shall the pro rata shares for the common
liability be determined in proportion to the per-
centage of negligence attributable to each tortfeasor. .. ?
(yes).
3. [W]hen a plaintiff in good faith has given one of
two or more persons liable in tort for his injury, a release.
• . . , shall the finder of fact determine the percentage of
negligence attributable to the released tort-feasor together
with the percentage of negligence attributable to the
parties and, if so, shall the award of damages to the
plaintiff be reduced.., by an amount proportionate to the
percentage of negligence allocated to the released tort-
feasor? (yes).
4. If there has been an amendment of chapter 32-38,
4 A tort-feasor who enters into a settlement with a claimant is not entitled to
recover contribution from another tort-feasor whose liability for the injtury or wrongful
death is not extingutished by the settlement nor in respect to any amount paid in
settlement which is in excess of what was reasonable.
Section 32-38-02. Pro rata shares.
In determining the pro rata shares of tort-feasors in the entire liability:
1. Their relative degrees s/fault shall not be considered.
2. If equity reqtires the collective liability of some as a grotp shall constitute a
single share.
3. Principles ofequity applicable to contribution generally shall apply.
Section 32-38-04. Release or covenant not to sue.
When.a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in
good faith to one or two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same
wrongful death:
1. It does not discharge any of the other tort-feasors from liability for the injury or
wrongfil death umless its terms so provide: but it reduces the claim against the others
to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the amount qf the
consideration paid for it, which ever is the 'reater.
2. It discharges the tort-feasor to whom it is given from all liability for
contribuition to any other tort-feasor.
276 N.W.2d at 116 (emphasis added).
37. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1976). For the text of this section seesupra note 27.
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what is the effective date of the amendment? (July 1,
1973). 38
The analysis that led Justice Sand to these conclusions was
largely one of statutory interpretation. The fact that section 9-10-07
was the later-enacted statute played a dominant role in this
analysis. The court reasoned that with its enactment, the legislature
had impliedly repealed section 32-38-02(1) 39 and amended section
32-38-04(1) by striking the words "of any amount stipulated by the
release or the covenant, or in the amount of consideration paid for
it, whichever is the greater" and substituting the language: "of the
relative degree of fault (percentage of negligence) attributable to the released
joint tort-feasors. "40 Justice Sand gave the following explanation for
the changes:
After analyzing the provisions of § 9-10-07, NDCC,
we are of the opinion that it is basically self-sufficient and
in that respect we agree with Victor E. Schwartz that
North Dakota, in enacting its comparative negligence act
(§ 9-10-07). . . , in effect adopted the pure comparative
negligence concept at least in instances involving more
than one tort-feasor. This concept also embraces related
matters and contemplates the allocation of costs on the
same percentage basis as the allocation of damages unless
justice requires otherwise.4'
To support his interpretation of the effect of section 9-10-07 on
contribution, Justice Sand traced the history of the section to its
Wisconsin origin. Recounting the Wisconsin Supreme Court's
lonely interpretation struggle, 42 and Minnesota's adoption of the
fruits of that struggle, 43 Justice Sand concluded that the North
38. The fll text of the (piestions and the court's answers appear in 276 N.W.2d at 122.
39. N.D. CENT. CooF § 32-38-02 (1976). For the text of this sect ion .rsupm note 35.
40. 276 N.W.2d at 121. Section 32-38-04 (1) of the North Dakota Cintry Code as Jodicially
amended, provides as follows:
When a release or a covenant not to ste or not to enforce iidgment is given in
good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injiry or the same
wrongfid death:
1. It does not discharge any of the other tort-feasors from liability for the initry
or wrongfol death unless its terms so provide; bit it redtices thie claim against
the others to the extent of the relative degree of./oult (percentage qf neglience) attri-
butable to the released joint tor-feasor....
276 N.W.2d at 121 (emphasis added).
41. Id. Seesupra note 31 for the Schwartz qoie in fidl.
42. 276 N.W.2d at 118-19.
43. Id. at 118.
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Dakota legislature, too, adopted the pre-1969 Wisconsin
interpretations when the section was enacted by North Dakota in
1973. 4
4
Two Wisconsin cases had an especially significant impact on
the interpretation of section 9-10-07 contribution, Bielski v. Schulze45
and Pierringer v. Hoger. 46 In Bielski the Wisconsin court determined
that the equity basis of Wisconsin's comparative negligence statute
required that statute to be interpreted to require contribution based
upon a comparison of fault, rather than equal share contribution by
all tort-feasors involved. 47 Pierringer established the contribution
rules to be applied when a release is involved. 48
Justice Sand was kind to the North Dakota legislature. It is un-
likely that the proponents of section 9-10-07 in the 1973 legislature
had intended the section to do anything except neutralize the pro-
no-fault forces. Nevertheless, by focusing the analysis on earlier
Minnesota and Wisconsin court decisions, and by giving the
members of the legislature credit for having read those decisions,
Justice Sand achieved the harmony sought without having to
reconcile the fundamental differences in the statutory schemes of
the three states. Especially relevant is the fact that Wisconsin and
Minnesota did not have a statute similar to section 32-38-04
dictating the effect that the amount of settlement would have in
determining the non-released tortfeasor's obligation. That statute
seems to call for the reduction of the claim against the non-released
tortfeasors by the actual dollar amount the plaintiff received from
the released tortfeasor, 49 which is the approach recently taken by
California . 5 0
The post-Bartels North Dakota approach is, at least in theory,
more equitable to all parties, especially non-released tortfeasors.
44. Id. The cotrt stated as follows:
Where a statute is taken from another state and adopted withoLut change it is
taken with the construction placed upon it by the court of last resort of the state from
whence the statute came. It is also prestumed that the legislature adopted the
constr uction previously placed upon it by the coLrts of the state from which the statute
was taken.
Id.
45. 16Wis.2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105(1962).
46.21 Wis.2d 182, 124 NW.2d 106 (1963).
47. Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis.2d 1, __, 114 N.W.2d 105, 108-09(1962).
48. Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d 182, __, 124 N.W.2d 106, 109(1963).
49. Section 32-38-04 of the North Dakota Centiry Code provides in part as follows: "When a
release . . . is given in good faith . . it reduces the claim against. . . [the non-released tortfeasors] to the
extent of any amount stipulated by the release..., or in the amount of the consideration paid for it,
whichever is the greater." N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-38-04 (1976) (emphasis added). See supra note 36
for full text of that section.
50. American Motorcycle Ass'n. v. Superior Court, 65 Cal. App. 3d 694, 135 Cal. Rptr. 497
(1977).
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To illustrate, assume that in Bartels the plaintiff's damages had been
$250,000, the plaintiff's causal fault 10 percent, the driver's causal
fault 75 percent, the city's causal fault 15 percent, and the driver
had settled with the plaintiff for $50,000. Applying the California
approach, the calculation used to determine the maximum dollar
amount plaintiff could recover would be: $250,000 less $25,000
(plaintiff's 10 percent), less $50,000 (amount of the settlement)
equals $175,000 recovery from the city. Utilizing the new North
Dakota approach the calculation would be $250,000 less $25,000
(plaintiff's 10 percent), less $187,500 (driver's 75 percent) equals
$37,500 (city's 15 percent) recovery from the city.
It could be argued that the California approach is more likely
to further the Bartels court's stated policy of encouraging
settlement. In the above hypothetical, the city apparently would be
more inclined to settle under the California approach, the exposure
to liability seeming disproportionally high in comparison to the
predicted causal fault. And under the Bartels approach, a plaintiff
would be less inclined to settle with the most culpable, but possibly
least solvent, joint tortfeasor, since by doing so he is limiting his
recovery from the other joint tortfeasor. It would seem that, at
least in the situation described in the illustration, a plaintiff would
want to obtain a judgment against both defendants as joint tort-
feasors so that he would be in a position to collect the whole
judgment from either.
Under either approach, however, the decision to settle belongs
to the plaintiff and the tortfeasors with whom he can effect a
settlement. The non-settling tortfeasors are not in a position to
complain because they also had the option of settlement.
Furthermore, at least when the Bartels approach is followed, the
non-settling tortfeasors are no worse off after the settlement than
they were before. 51
By settling with one joint tortfeasor the plaintiff has waived
the language of section 9-10-07 which provides that "each shall
51. Comtare, Release of Joint Tortfeasors: Use of the Pierrineer Release in Minnesota, 3 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 1, 19-22 (1977), with American Motorcycle Ass'n. v. Superior Court, supra note 50. See also
Note, Products Liability, 'Comparative Negligence, and the Allocation of-Damages Among Multiple Defendants, 50
So. CAL. L. REV. 73, 106-07 (1976).
The nonsettling tortfeasor is, however, at a distinct tactical disadvantage. By way of example,
Simonett suggests these concerns:
By allowing the plaintiff to settle with one defendant, the plaintiff is better able to
finance his lawsuit against the non-settling party. . . . Also, the non-settling tortfeasor
finds himself no longer able to cross-examine the settling tortfeasor as an adverse
party. The settling tortfeasor may or may not be adverse but he very definitely is no
longer a party, and so must be called as the non-settling tortfeasor's own witness ....
3WM. MITCHELL L. REV. at 21.
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remain jointly and severally liable for the whole award." 52
Considering, as the Bartels court did, that "North Dakota, in
enacting. . . § 9-10-07. . . adopted the pure comparative
negligence concept at least in instances involving more than one
tort-feasor" 5 3 what effect would the plaintiff's waiver of joint and
several liability have on the application of section 9-10-07 when
more than one non-settling tortfeasor remained in the trial? Would
each remaining tortfeasor's liability to the plaintiff be determined
in accordance with pure comparative negligence principles? What
if the plaintiff is determined to be negligent? How would the
determination of whether his negligence "was not as great as the
negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought. . ." be
made? These questions are not answered in Bartels. In fact, the
court cautioned against reading too much into the court's responses
to the certified questions. 54
At least one collateral concern clearly was resolved. With the
decision in Bartels, the last obstacle faced by the North Dakota
practitioner interested in using the Pierringer release has been
removed. That release, named after the Wisconsin case initially
approving its terms, was described by one source as follows:
In its simplest form, the Pierringer release (1) releases the
settling defendant from the lawsuit and discharges a part
of the cause of action equal to that part attributable to the
settling joint tort-feasor's causal negligence, (2) reserves
'the balance of the whole cause of action' against the non-
settling joint tort-feasors, and (3) contains an agreement
whereby the plaintiff indemnifies the settling defendant
from any claims of contribution made by the non-settling
parties and agrees to satisfy any judgment he obtains
from the non-settling tort-feasors to the extent the settling
tort-feasor has been released. 55
52. 276 N.W.2d at 122.
53. Id. at 121.
54. Id. at 123. The court stated the following:
While some of the answers to the certified questions may have general
application, we must nevertheless caution that they were piedicated upon the facts of
this case, particularly the general release given to one of the alleged tort-feasors. The
absence of a general release or a different set oi' facts conceivably coild prodce
different answers.
Id.
55. Simonett, Release ofJoint Tqftfeasors: Use of the Pierringer Release in Minnesota, 3 Wm. MITCHELL.
L. REV. 1, 3 (1977). Simonett stated "the release was designed to operate in a iirtsdisition which has
comparative negligence to apportion liability between defendants, uses the special verdict form, and allows
contribution between joint tortfeasors." Id. at I I (emphasis added).
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The Bartels court specifically approved the Pierringer release
concept, 56 and approved by implication the Minnesota practice
guidelines found in Frey v. Snelgrove.57 The use of the Pierringer
release in North Dakota should facilitate the court's stated objective
of encouraging compromise and settlement.
Th Pierringer release as a settlement device shotld be distinguished from other commonly tsed
devices. Simonett identifies and distinguishes three such devices:
A loan receipt is a settlement device, by which the settling defendant loans a specific sum
of money. withoui interest, to the plaintiff. The plaintiff promises to repay the loan
from any judginent obtained against the non-settling defendant. The plaintiff is not
obligated to repay the loan from any portion ofa udgment which exceeds the amomnt
of the loan. The plaintiff'also agrees to p,,rsue his claim against the non-settling defen-
dant.
A htgh-low a.greement is a settlement devit e. by which a plaintiff and defendant
agree to set minimum and maximum limits on the ultimate award regardless of the
jtry's decision. The defendant pays the minimum sum to the plaintiff at the time of
settlement. .... The parties may also agree to submit to an arhitrator who would
award damages within the agreed limits....
A covenant not to sue is an agreement entered into by the plaintiff and a settling oint
tortfeasor, whereby the plaintiff agrees not to commence or continte to prosecuite any
action based uipon the claim in dispute in return for a specified sum of money. . . . A
covenant need not reserve the right to ste other oint tortfeasors for that right to
remain effective. Bit the reservation of soth i right is important in determining
whether the parties intended the right to exist or whether thev' intended to settle the
claim entirely and release the otherjoint tortfeasors from the action.
Id. at 2-3 nn. 2-4 (emphasis added).
The same commentator also distinguishes the largely discredited "Mary Carter Agreement":
In a Mtarv Carter Agreement, the plaintiff and one of the defendants agree that (I) the
contracting deflendant gtiarantees plaintiff a specific sum if plaintitff loses the case or
recovers less than a certain stim; (2) the contracting defendant's maximum liability
mav he reduced if the liability of a codefendant is increased; and (3) the contracting
defendant stays active in the trial as a party but the agreement is kept secret.
Id. at 20 n.98 (emphasis added).
Minnesota and North Dakota courts woild not tolerate sutch an agreement. See Frey v.
Snelgrove, __ Minn. __ , 269 N.W.2d 918, 923 (1978). "When a settlement or release is entered
into, the trial court and other parties should be immediately notified, and the terms of the agreement
made a part ofthe record." Id.
For a good discussion of "Mary Carter" type agreements and the question of when the
existence of a settlement agreement should be disclosed to a .itry see General Motors Corp. v.
Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 856-59 (Tex. 1977).
56. 276 N.W.2d at 119.
57. __ Minn. - 269 N.W.2d 918 (1978). The release given by the plaintiffin Snelgrove and
approved by the Minnesota Court, contained two additional provisions not foind in a typical
Pierringer release. "JFirst,J [tlhe indemnity clause covered cross-claims for 'indemnity as well as
contribition and Isecondi the amount paid for the settlement was contingent upon the amount
recovered against the nonagreeing party at trial rather than a sum certain." Id. at-, 269 N W.2d
at 921 n.1.
Following are the practice guidelines suggested by the court for fitire consideration:
When a settlement or release is entered into, the trial court and other parties should be
immediately notified, and the terms of the agreement made a part of the record. If the
plaintiff has agreed to indemnify the settling defendant against all possible cross-claims
of the non-settling parties, the trial court should ordinarily dismiss the settling
defendant from the case, in accordance with the Pierringer release. Since the settling
defendant has fixed his limits of financial liability to the plaintiff by entering into the
release, he is deemed also to have relinquished any cross-claims against the remaining
defendants.
On the other hand, if a nonsettling party has cross-claims for both contribution
and indemnity, either of which is not covered by the terms of the release, then the
settling defendant should continue as a party for the limited purpose of defending
against the suirviving cross-claim.
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C. POST-BARTELS: WHERE To Now?
The North Dakota court's equity approach to the resolution of
the section 9-10-07 issues raised in Bartels should provide the
flexibility needed to resolve a number of other concerns which the
court will probably face in the very near future. Some of these
issues have been considered by both the Wisconsin and Minnesota
courts, and, given the approval by the Bartels court of a large body
of Wisconsin and Minnesota caselaw, it is expected that the law of
those states will continue to have a strong influence on the North
Dakota Supreme Court. This is especially true of early Wisconsin
cases 58 and more recent Minnesota cases.5 9
In almost every case the trial court should submit to the ;Ory the faolt of all
parties, including the settling defendants, even thoogh they have been dismissed from
the lawsuit. If there is "evidence of conduct which, if believed by the .try, wotld
constitute negligence [or fault] on the part of the person * * * inqtired aboot," the
ftilt or negligence of that party should be stobmitted to thetry. [Cite omitted.]
Where the settlement and release agreement is executed during trial, the court
shotld usually inform the jury that "there has been a settlement and release if for no
other reason than to explain the settling tortfeasor's conspicuos absence from the
ruo irt room."
Although a release agreement is admissible tunder Rule 408 of the Roles of
Evidence. where it is offered for i purpose such as proving bias or preidice of a
witness, it is within the trial court's discretion to determine whether to admit the
aettal agreement into evidence, or the details thereof. Thejtury should be given those
facts netessary to arrive at a fair verdict to all parties, but as a general rule the amotnt
paid in settlement should never be sulbmitted. That figure itself may have little relation
to the acttal damages of a plaintiff, since it may reflect a compromise, the evaluation
of a defendant's potential liabilitv. and man' other factors not relevant to a .itry's
consideration of actual monetary, damages.
The foregoing procedures are gidelines to be applied so as to assore a fair trial to
all parties and may be modified when that end would not be served. A trial court's
deviation would not constitte error if those modifications substantially protect the
rights ofall parties and preserve the adversary process.
Id. at 9 23.
58. This is especially trte of Wisconsin cases that interpreted the Wisconsin comparative
negligence sta,ite prior to Minnesota's adoption of that statite in 1969.
59. While the Minnesota cases decided prior to 1973. the year North Dakota adopted the
Minnesota (Wisconsin?) comparative negligence statute, are the most relevant, it can be expected
that all Minnesotia decisions prior to 1978, the year Minnesota amended its comparative negligence
statute, will be considered persuasive by the North Dakota Court. See 276 N.W.2d at 120. Cases with
which the North Dakota lawver may wish to become familiar include: Frey v. Snelgrove.
__ Minn.-_. 269 N.W.2d 918 (1978): Aninti v. Pavette. Minn.-, 268 N.W.2d 52
(1978): Butsch v. Btsch Constr. In. __ Minn.__ , 262 N.W.2d 377 (1977); Pacific Indem. Co. v.
Thotipson-Yager. Inc., -Minn.__ 260 N. '.2d 548: Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp.,
__Minn.__ , 257 N.W.2d 679 (1977): Ixenburg v. Can-Tex Indus ... -Minn.__ , 257
N.W.2d 804 (1977); Tolbert v. Gerber Indus. Inc., __ Minn. __ 255 N.W.2d 362 (1977);
Ferguson v. Northern States Power Co., 307 Minn. 26, 239 N.W.2d 190 (1976); Smedsrud v.
Brown, 303 Minn. 330, 227 N.W.2d 572 (1975): Kowalski v. Armour and Co.. 300 Minn. 301, 220
N.W.2d 268 (1974): Winge v. Minnesota Transfer Ry. Co., 294 Minn. 246, 201 N.W.2d 259
(1972): Keefer v. Al.[ohnson Constr. Co., 292 Minn. 91, 193 N.W.2d 305 (1971).
Furthermiore. becaose it appears that the 1978 amendments to the Minnesota comparattve
negligence statute 'ere largely a I legislative approval of Irior action taken by the Minnesota cotirt
(compare NNx. STT. ANN. § 604.01 (Suipp. 1978). set out below, with Blisch v. Bosch Constr. Co.,
-Minn__ , 262 N.W.2d 377, 393-94 (1977) (discussed infra at notes 89 throuigh 105 and
accompanying t(xt)), post- 19 7 8 decisions should be persuasive as well.
Section 604.101 of NI innesota Statutes Annotated, as aiended in 1978, provides as follows:
1. Contribtr t 's failt shall not bar recovery in an action bv an' person or his legal
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Selected for discussion in the following sections are three such
issues: 6
0
1. Will the section 9-10-07 amendments to chapter 32-38 set
out in Bartels affect the immunity from suit which employers
covered by workman's compensation now enjoy for workplace
injuries to covered employees?
2. Will those amendments affect the scope of tort-feasor's
"joint and several" liability?
3. Will "ordinary negligence" be compared with Restatement
402A-type "strict liability"?
1. Bartels and Workmen's Compensation Law
The policies for adopting a workplace compensation plan are
well known. The common law was ineffective in resolving disputes
between an employer and an employee concerning employee on-
the-job injuries. In its place many states have substituted "no
fault" compensation plans that exchange the employee's claim
against the employer for a no-fault payment based upon a fixed
schedule.
Ever present in the workplace, however, are industrial
products that account for many serious injuries. Some of these
injuries are caused by employee negligence, some are caused by
employer negligence, and some are caused by defects in the
products themselves; many inluries, however, are caused by a
combination of all three.
The problem simply stated is this: under workmen's
compensation laws, the employer is immunized from suit by the
employee, but the manufacturer of the injury-causing product is
representative to recover damages for fault resulting in ,heath or in in;.try to person or
property, if the ,ontribtory fault was not greater than the a.Itlw of the person against
whom ret overy is sotght, bt any damages allowed shall Ie diminished in proportion
to the amotmt of fat attribtable to the person recovering. The court may, and when
ret1 csted by any party shall, direct the piry to finl separate special verdi'ts
determining the amoint of damages and the percentage of fil attributable to each
party; an(l the co, irt shall then redce the amotnt of damages in proportion to the
amount of fault attributable to the person recovering.
Ia. "Faolt" incltdes acts or omissions that ar in any measure negligent or
reckless toward the person or property ofi hit  roir o others, or that s b)iet a person to
strict tort liability. The term also incht ts breach of' warranty. t reasunable
ass. mption of risk not constitluing an express consein, ltiso se ift a prod it and
oreasonable failire to avoid an initry or to mitigate damages. Legal rei1 irements of
ca.sal relation apply both to fault as the basis for liability and to contribuiry fault.
MtNx. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (S.ipp. 1978).
60. This is not to suggest there are only three. Nor shotld the reader expect an exhatstive
discussion of the three mentioned. Each of these issues is a research topic in itself. The discossion
that follows appears here for illistrative purposes. For more detailed discussions see articles cited at
note 86 infra.
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not. Where both the employer and the manufacturer are responsible
for the injury they become joint tortfeasors. Because the employer
is immune from suit, the manufacturer can be held accountable for
all of the employee's damages, including, in many states, the
amount paid to the employee out of the Workmen's Compensation
Fund.61
The importance of this concern in the context of the larger
"products liability problem" was dramatized in a recent survey.
"According to the Insurance Services Office Closed Claims
Survey, only 11 percent of product liability incidents involve
workers injured on the job. Nevertheless, these incidents account
for 42 percent of the total payment of bodily injury claims. ", 62 The
precentage of that payment reflecting sums paid by product-
producers for injuries caused by employer negligence has not been
determined, but even a small percentage is significant.
The problem is under study on the federal level, and among
the solutions suggested is the one found in the Commerce
Department Draft Uniform Product Liability Law. 63 Section 113 of
this law proposes that an employer be subject to contribution claims
from third party tortfeasors for a sum not to exceed the worker
compensation lien. 64 Such an "employer contribution" approach
was recently taken by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Lambertson
61. For a good discussion of this problem, see 2A A. LARSON, WOR1IFMN'S COMPENSATION § 76.00
(1976).
62. See Schwartz, Federal Action on Product Liability - What Has Occurred and What Alay Occur, 14
FORtM 287, 301 (1978). Schwartz states as follows:
Under the law in a malority of states, the tort system appears to aggravate this
siltation. When a worker is injired by a produtct in the workplace and brings a
Worker Compensation claim, he is likely to receive some payment. Then, fie may
obtain counsel (tinder a contingent fee arrangement) in the hope of receiving
additional payment, e.g., fuill loss of wages, recovery for pain and suffering. When the
worker brings a claim, his employer or Worker compensation carrier may join in with
a stibrogation lien, and attempt to recover all monies that were paid to the worker
tnder the Worker Compensation system. This, in a majority ofstates, if the worker is
soiccessfid in his claim, the entire cost of the accident may be borne by the prodtct
manitfacttirer, even if the employer has been negligent with respect to the way he
maintained the product.
Id.
63. U.P.L.L. supra NOTE 2. A draft of this model law will likely be released while this article is at
the press.
Other solutions stuggested inclde a Federal Worker Compensation plan (see Schwartz, supra
note 62, at 302) and an amendment to OSHA which wold allow contrib,tion or indemnity against
an employer who violated any OSHA provision or standard. See Birnbaum, Legislative Reform or
Retreat? A Response to the Product Liability Crisis, 14 FORUM 251, 268 (1978).
64. U.P.L.L. supra note 2. Section 113 states as follows:
In the case of any claim brotight tinder this Act by or on behalf of a person who has
been or will be compensated for iniries under a state worker compensation law,
where an employer's failtre to comply with any statttory or common law dutty relating
to workplace safety shall be sthiect to a contribution claim provided in Section 112 of
this Act for a som not to exceed the amount of the worker compensation lien.
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v. Cincinnati Corp., 65 when it held an employer liable for
contribution up to the amount of compensation benefits. Lest the
reader become concerned that we are straying from our underlying
theme, consider the now-familiar analysis of the Minnesota court:
Comparative negligence, which is embodied in
Minn. St. 604.01 and was substantially borrowed from
our sister state of Wisconsin in 1969, introduces yet
another dimension to the third-party tort-feasor's
predicament. By abolishing the defense of contributory
negligence in cases where plaintiff's percentage of total
causal negligence i less than defendant's, it permits an
iniured workman to recover against the third party more
frequently. In addition, Minn. St. 604.01, subd. 1,
specifies a rule for contribution:
cc **When there are two or more persons who are
jointly liable, contributions to awards shall be in
proportion to the percentage of negligence
attributable to each, provided, however, that each
shall remain jointly and severally liable for the whole
award. "
Thus, a jointly liable tort-feasor has an interest, at least
where the other tort-feasors are solvent and otherwise
available for contribution, in contributingno more to the
plaintiff's recovery than the percentage of negligence
attributable to him. 66
The court further stated:
While there is no common liability to the employee in tort,
both the employer and the third party are nonetheless
liable to the employee for his injuries; the employer
through the fixed no-fault workers' compensation system
and the third party through the variable recovery
available in a common law tort action. Contribution is a
flexible, equitable remedy designed to accomplish a fair
65. __ Minn. __, 257 N.W.2d 679 (1977). Lambertson over-ruded Hendrickson v. Minnesota
Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 104 N.W.2d 843 (1960), which had held there was no right of
contribution where there was no common liability to the employee, and the exchsive-remedy
provision of the Minnesota workers' compensation law precluded that. Id. at __, 258 N.W.2d at
849.
66. Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 257 N.W.2d 679, 686 (1977).
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allocation of loss among parties. Such a remedy should be
utilized to achieve fairness on particular facts, unfettered
by outworn technical concepts like common liability.67
Other state courts have recently confronted this issue and
reached vastly divergent results. 68 This is due largely to the
interaction of infinite combinations of worker compensation laws,
comparative negligence laws, products liability laws, and
contribution and indemnity laws. Each state, including North
Dakota, is unique in its approach to this combination of laws. For
that reason the resolution of the problem might best be left to the
legislature. Bartels does, however, provide a precedential
contribution formula for making the necessary modifications,
notwithstanding the existence of statutes that on their face seem to
prohibit those modifications. 69 The broad-sweeping equity concern
that characterizes chapter 32-38, as amended by Bartels, would
justify the North Dakota court's action, and the Lambertson
approach seems the likely direction the court would take. 7 0
Although the Lambertson approach is a good first step, that
approach does not go far enough. Workers' compensation benefits
are analogous to the consideration given for the release in Bartels.
While workers' compensation is a mandated settlement foisted on
the parties (employer and employee) by the legislature, the release
is voluntary in that the claimant chooses whether to settle. Each is,
however, a payment given in consideration for the claimant's right
67. Id. at 688.
68. Ser Seaboard Coast Line R.C. Co. v. Smith. 359 So.2d 427 (Fla. 1978): Skinner v. Reed-
Prentice Div. Pkge. Mach. Co.. 70 lll.2d 1. 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977). modified 70 I1. 2d 16 (1978):
LIlertv M,. Ins. Co. v. Westerlind, M__ ass_ , 373 N.E.2d 957 (1978): Seattle First Nat'l
Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wash.2d 230. 588 P.2d 1308 (1978).
69. See N.D. C ENT. Coon § 65-01-08 (1960).
70. The Lambertson approach seems less complicated and less arbitrary than the approach
s.iggested hv Prof. John W. Wade for inchlsion in the Uniform Comparative Falt Act. The
proposed section 6a titled Action by EmploveeAgainst Third-Party Defendant states as follows:
(a) Ifan employee who has (laimed or is entitled to claim against the employer benefits
tnder fthe worker's compensation act] brings a tort action against another person to
recover additional damages for the injory, the employer mav be joined bv the
defendant as a party for the porpose of determining the percentage of faolt allocahe in
accordance with Section 2 to the employer in comparison wilh the combined fadlt of
all of the parties, including the claimant.
On the basis of those findings the cotrt shall determine the award to the claimant
by subtracting from the amoont of the damages half of the amomt that, except for the
iworker's compensation act]. would have been allocated as the primary responsibility
of the employer; and it shall render itdgment in accordance wsith the provisions of
Section 2. After paying the joidgment, the defendant may recover front the employer
the other half ofthe amount that wotld have been allocated to the employer.
This proposal, and Prof. Wade's itstification for its provisions, are found at Wade, Products
Liability and Plaintiff's Fault - The Uniform Comparative Fault Act. 29 MERcEr I.. Rrs'. 373. 390-91
(1978). Appended to Wade's article, commencing at page 392. is the fil text of the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act.
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to bring an action against a potential defendant. In the workers'
compensation situation that potential defendant is the employer; in
the Bartels situation it is the released tortfeasor. It follows that the ef-
fect on the non-released tortfeasor's obligation should be the same.
Given the modest awards granted under most workers'
compensation plans the result suggested may be seen as unfair to
the employee-claimant. If it is, however, the fault is not the non-
released tortfeasor's; rather, it is the fault of the legislatively
mandated compromise between the employer and the employee. It is
that legislation which has removed the remaining tortfeasor's right
to contribution from the employer. If the consideration given to the
employee is inadequate, it is the compensation system that has
unfairly treated the employee, not the non-released tortfeasor. As
Justice Sand wrote in Bartels, "we. should avoid a construction
which would permit an imposition of greater liability on a
nonreleased tort-feasor with a right of contribution in a multiple-
party-tortfeasor situation."'" There is no more reason to allow a
legislatively imposed settlement to increase a non-released tort-
feasor's liability than there is to allow a settlement voluntarily
entered into by some of the parties to the action to do so.
2. Joint and Several Liability
Nothing in the Bartels decision would suggest that North
Dakota is inclined toward abolishing its rule that joint tortfeasors
are jointly and severally liable to an injured plaintiff. Rather, the
case reinforces the state's commitment to this concept by making
the contribution rules more equitable. 7 2
71. 276 N.W. 2d at 121.
72. North Dakota shoold consider making the contribution ritles even more equitable by
adopting the "reallocation" concept advanced by the Uniform Comparative Fault Act (see Section 2
of the Act). Minnesota has adopted a substantially modified version of the Uniform Act approach.
Compare Section 604.02 of Minnesota's statute, set out below, with Section 2 of the Uniform
Comparative Falt Act (1978). Section 604.02 states as follows:
Subd. 1. When two or more persons are jointly liable, contributions to awards
shall be in proportion to the percentage of fa,dt attributable to each, except that each is
Iointly and severally liable for the whole award.
Subd. 2. Upon motion made not later than one year after jidgment is entered.
the cottrt shall determine whether all or part of a party's equitable share of the
obligation is oncollectible from that party and shall reallocate any incollectible
arnotint among the other parties, including a claimant at fault, according to their
respective percentages of fault. A party whose liability is reallocated is nonetheless
shbiect to contribution and to any contining liability to the claimant on the
idgment.
Sd)d. 3. In the case of a claim arising from the manifactire, sale. use or
consutrption of a product, an amount incollectible from an\.' person in the chain of
manuifactre and distribution shall be reallocated among all other persons in the chain
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In the process of attempting to achieve equity between the
tortfeasors, however, the same qualitative judgment that requires
that there be a determination of the relative fault of the tortfeasors
involved mandates comparison of the relative fault of the plaintiff
with the relative fault of each of the tortfeasors. With the relative
fault of each actor determined, the historical bases of some joint tort-
feasor. categories73 are eliminated. That certainly is true of the
"single indivisible injury rule," especially when the plaintiff is
found to have been partially at fault.
The Minnesota Supreme Court faced this issue in a relatively
recent case. Kowalske v. Armour & Co. 4 involved a plaintiff who
contracted brucellosis under circumstances suggesting that the
cause could have been traced to either or both of the defendants
involved. A jury found the plaintiff to be 10 percent at fault, one
defendant 80 percent at fault, and the second defendant 10 percent
at fault.75 The issue was whether the 10 percent at fault defendant's
fault was "greater than" the plaintiff's fault,7 6 a requirement of the
comparative negligence law then in effect in Minnesota. If the de-
fendants were jointly and severally liable, the fault of the two
defendants would be added and the plaintiff could recover 90
percent of his injuries from either; if they were not jointly liable the
10 percent at fault plaintiff could recover nothing from the 10
percent at fault defendant. The court held that the two defendants
were not jointly and severally liable even though there was
concurrent causation of a single indivisible result. The court gave
the following explanation for its decision:
It is true that this court has often held that where two
of nanilactre and distribtion bt not ansong the clainant or others at fault who are
not in the chain of manfactore or distribotion of the product. Provided. however.
that a person whose faIt is less than that of a clainant is liable to the claimant only for
that portion of the judgment which represents the percentage of fa,ult attrib,ttable to
hitt.
MINN. STAT. ANN. 5604.02 (West 1978).
73. Dean Prosser lists nine broad categories under which two or tIotre defendants
will be liable in tort for the satte damages: (1) concerted action: (2) vicarios liability .
(3) common duty: (4) concorrent catsation ofa single, indivisible tres it. which neither
would have caused alone: (5) concorent caisation of a single. indivisible result, which
either alone would have cased: (6) soccessive injulries (7) daisage of the sane kind.
which is difficllt to apportion: (8) acts. innocent in themselves, which together cause
damtage: antd] (9) alternative liability.
Note. Products L ability. Comparative N.le~hece. and the Alocation ofDamages A mongA Multiple Defendants, 50
S. CA._ I.L. RF;vs 73. 80 n.39 (1976). citing Piosser. Joint Torts and Several Liabilit, 25 CAL. L. REv.
413. 429-41 (1937).
74. :100 Ninn. 301.220 N.W. 2d 268 (1974).
75. Kowalske v. Armour & Co.. 300 Minn. 301,220 N.W.2d 268 (1974).
76. Id at _, 220 N.W. 2d at 272.
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or more persons are guilty of negligence and cause
damage to another, which damage is incapable of being
apportioned among the negligent parties, the negligent
parties are jointly and severally liable.
It is essential to note that such rule of joint and
several liability applies only when plaintiff is free from
negligence. . . . .. [T]he rule is a result of a choice made as
to where a loss due to failure of proof [as to the
apportionability of damages] shall fall - on an innocent
plaintiff or on defendants who are clearly proved to have
been at fault." Such is not the case before us since the
plaintiff, deemed 10-percent negligent by the jury, is also
at fault in causing the single, indivisible injury.77
The single indivisible injury rule developed at a time when
contributory negligence of the plaintiff barred the plaintiff's
recovery, and defendants were not allowed contribution from each
other. In that context it facilitated a measure of equity. Where,
however, a jurisdiction not only compares the negligence of all the
parties, but also provides for contribution based upon relative fault,
there is little justification for applying the rule to every difficult
multi-defendant apportionment-of-damage situation. Barlels makes
it possible for North Dakota to make the Kowalske modification of
the "single indivisible injury" rule. After that modification is
77. Id. at , 220 N. X.2d 272. ('f Seattle First Nat'l Bank s. Shorliot' CootcrOt Co., 91
Wash.2d 230, 588 P.2d 1308 (1978), where the court stated the following:
Since the harm ca,ised by both joint and tinttroflt tort-fi'asors is indivisibl,' similar
liablity atlaches. We have long thl that st h ort-fleastrs are each liable for the intir'
harm caused and the injured party may sue one or all to obtain full recovery....
While the indivisibility ol the har m aost'd warranls impoisitiot oftottire liabiliv
opon those tort-f easirs, soid polity reasons alsi s'pptrt atpplication of tht
prt ed,ral. or several. aspect t he liability r .tl l' etrni'rsttne tl trt law is the
assirantce oft ,l ( imptnsation to (hi' initred party. to atain this goial, the procthiral
aspect ofoir rile permits iht inired party tt seek I'dl rcto'cry from any one or all of
sth Iori-fi'asors. Sit long as tath tor-feasors's ctodhi is Ittondt(o hitase Ixt't a
proximate'i cats of thi'tndivivihle harm, we t an t tt(oiitts'ef no ras(mi fri relitsing tltit
rort-feasor of his risponsibility to make fidl compensation for all hartt he has ia,tsed tt
(he initred party. What may )he equiitable hetteen multiple tort-frasor is an isse totalls
disorcd front what is fair to the in a rid party. Thtis, we cannot accept respondents'
soeggestion that joint and several liabiilivy is appropriate only for "joint" tort-feasors.
Finally, even when a plaintiffis partially at lth for his own iniry, his ilpability
is no( of the same natire as defendant's. A plaintiff's negligence relates to a failor" to
,tse die care for hiv own protection whereas a defendant's negligence relates to a faihlre to
,,se d,te care.f or the safety ofothers. While a plaintiffs self-directed negligence may j,,stify
reducing his rertovery in proportiin to his degree offault, the fact remains that such
conditict o nlike that ofa negligent defendant, is not tortits.
Id. at -_, 588 P. 2d at 1312-14 (emphasis original).
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made, possibly the only convincing argument left for retention of
the remnants of the rule is the suggestion that the risk of insolvency
of one or more of the tortfeasors should fall upon the remaining
tortfeasors rather than the wholly fault-free plaintiff. While that
suggestion has a certain amount of appeal, it would seem that
equity demands that tortfeasors not acting in concert should be
responsible only for the injuries each caused individually. 78
3. Strict Products Liability and Negligence Compared
It was suggested earlier that the evolution of tort law benefits
from the microscopic analysis to which it is subjected by the
adversary process. The interpretation problem plaguing
Restatement 402A is a good example of what too often happens
when that analysis does not take place.
Restatement 402A was the work product of Dean Prosser, and
with its adoption by the American Law Institute79 modern products
78. Byway of illistration, wotuld it have been eq,itable in Kowaltke to hold that same 10 percent
at failt defendant responsible for 100 percent of the plaintiff's injuiries if the other defendant had
been 90 percent at fa,dt, and the plaintiff fatlt-free? If the 90 percent at falt defendant is insolvent
that is exactly what wotuld happen. Or, taking the illustration to its extreme, wodd it be eqctitable for
a 1 percent at fault defendant to be placed in a similar situ!ation ifa plaintiffis fault-free, bu!t not if the
plaintiffis also 1 percent at fault?
For discussion of joint and several liability and toincler concerns see Seattle First Nat'l Bank v.
Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wash. 2d 230, 588 P.2d 1308, 1312-14 (1978); Boone, Multiple-Party
Litiation and Comparative Ngh~i'ence, 45 Ins. CoUNsEiL.1. 335, 337-40 (1978). Note, Products Liability,
Comparative Neieence, and the Allocation of Damages Amng Multiple Defrndants, 50 S. CAi.. L. REV. 7.3,
80-81 (1976). Comment, Brown and Miles: At last, an end to Ambtuity in the Kansas Law of Comparative
Ne~igence, 27 K,N. L. REV. 111, 120 (1978).
79. Ifthere is a "law related person" who doubts William Lloyd Prosser deserved the title "Mr.
Torts," that person should consider this: in 1965 Dean Prosser convinced the American laaw
Instituite that his revol tionary theory of products liability was in reality only a restatement of
existing law. At the time there were only two significant cases that stipported his views, Henningsen
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). and Greenman v. Yiba Power Prods.,
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57. 377 P.2cd 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
Two leading torts scholars dedicated the casebook W. PRossEr, J. WA., & V. Scli' ARTS,
TORTS (6th Ed. 1976) to Prosser in these words: "To William Lloyd Prosser, Mr. Torts in the
lexicon of any law-related person. Both the editors and the users of this casebook are greatly in his
debt."
Prosser's theory became Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Cons,!mer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the iser or consumer or to his property is suiject to liability for
physical harm thereby cauised to the dtimate iser or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling su ch a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the iser or consumer witho,o
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The ride stated in Suibsection (1) applies althouigh
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale ofhis product, and
(b) the uiser or consuimer has not bought the produhct from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402 (a) (1965).
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liability law was born. 80 The idea was apparently a good one,
because within ten years the concept had been accepted by the great
majority of American jurisdictions.
North Dakota has specifically adopted Restatement 402A. 8'
The North Dakota Supreme Court's stated reason for doing so was
to avoid any ambiguity as to the form of strict products liability
adopted by them.8 2 Forgotten by the North Dakota court was the
fact that Prosser's formulation was only an outline of a law
professor's theory. 83 It contains little to aid courts and juries with
the practical problems facing them in products liability actions.
Furthermore, the comments to section 402A, and in particular
comment n, raised more questions than they answer. 84
The inherent ambiguities contained in section 402A and its
comments are the basis of the difficulties which courts are currently
encountering in products liability actions. Section 402A evolved
without taking into account the vast amount of societal values it
affected.8 5 The result has been confusion on one hand and out-
right rebellion on the other. North Dakota is suffering from a little
of both, as are most states which have adopted 402A. Only well-
reasoned guidance from courts and sound legislation can restore
order. Bartels is a good first step; the logical next step will be
comparison of negligence with 402A strict liability.
80. For an historical perspective of the development of prodicts liability law, see Wade, On the
Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Produc, 44 Miss L..J. 825 (1973); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadd (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. RF.v. 791 (1966); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L. J. 1099 (1960).
81. SeeJohnson v. American Motors Corp., 225 N.W.2d 57, 66 (N.D. 1974).
82. Id.
83. Given the paucity of jurisdictions espousing comparative negligence in 1965, Prosser's
failure to resolve in 402A the now important question of whether 402A strict liability can be
compared with ordinary negligence, may be excused. Inasmuch as the North Dakota legislature had
so recently (within the prior year) passed a comparative negligence statute, it would seem that the
North Dakota court should have addressed the question when it adopted 402A. Since the Wisconsin
court had done so with the very same comparative negligence statute some six years before (see infra
notes 86 through 91 and accompanying text), the members of the court were probably aware that the
issue would be raised. It is, ofcourse, possible the court thought that it had answered the question by
not raising it.
84. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
85. This article concerns the tort defendant's struggle for eqttity. In this context it seems
appropriate to discuss societal values. Whether or not it is trite, the statement has often been made
that the policy reason behind 402A is one of loss distribution. It is said that products liability
defendants should be held strictly liable for damages to a consumer associated with the use of a
product because the business community is in a position to easily spread the cost ofthose damages by
moderate increases in the price of goods sold in the future. However, there appear to be flaws in this
reasoning.
First. not all 402 defendants are in a position to spread the loss. Second, why should fiture pir-
chasers pay for damages caused by past mistakes, especially those damages associated with
mistakes made by other consumers? Some of the largest products liability awards have been awarded
to consumers of drugs and users of automobiles. Who needs drugs and automobiles? The sick, the
lame, and the elderly are the biggest consumers of druigs, and every man, woman, and child, rich
and poor, is a user of automobiles. Third, why should the filtUre profits of products liability
defendants be used to pay all the damages of a negligent person who happens to be injired while
using a product? Negligent persons will be injured. They will be iniured while using defect-free
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The logical starting point of any discussion8 6 of comparison of
negligence with strict liability is Dippel v. Sciano,87 a 1967 product
liability decision which resulted in Wisconsin being the first
jurisdiction to apply its comparative negligence statute to strict
product liability cases. The Dippel court first concluded that
"fs]trict liability does not make the manufacturer or seller an
insurer nor does it impose absolute liability." 88 The court found
that strict liability is a species of negligence, and gives to a plaintiff
the same proof and procedural advantages that a plaintiff has if
prodocts, and they will be inimred while osing defective prodctis. And when injored, society will, ini
it' niallnr or ot anothler, bear the cost of Ihe careless person's act. The person of means will have
insuance i and through insurance the loss will be distribntted. The person without means will have
wellare, and( through tihe tax systeni the loss ,,',ill be redistribted. In addition to these two general
loss-distriftting devices lie collateral soitr(e benefits flowing from the workplace; workman's
cont'nsation: social security benefits: hospital, doctor, dentist and disability insorance; sick pay;
an t memiployitent insitrance, to name a few. The point may be obviois. The business community
pays iIIt' cost of work-place be.nefits (as well as tie lion's share of taxes, direct and indirect), and is,
therefore, already, tlte m ior "no-fault" loss-distributing agent for an individual's damages for
injtries received from any cause. To suggest that it should again pay, regardless of fault, runs contra
to Americans' sense oftuistice.
That is not to suggest that the American sense of Jtstice is offended when a product's prodtcer is
asked t shoulder the responsibility for the damages cautsed by a defect in that product. Any number
of social policies suggest that the producer (or other responsible defendant) should do so, bit only to
tile extenti ofiit damages associated with that responsibility.
Hail 402A cleaty provided for these concerns there wvoild be no need to debate whether strict
liahilitv and negligence can be compared tnder a state's comparative negligence law. See infra notes
86 Iliittugh 1(17.
86. There have been many' stth discussions in recent sears. See, e.g., Boone, Multiple-Party
Litiuation and Comparative Neligence, 45 INS. CoixSEI.1. 335 (1978); Brewster, Comparative Negligence in
Strict Liability Cases, 42 J. AIR L. & Cost. 107 (1976): Feinberg, The Applicability of a Comparative
Negligenrc Dfnse in a Strict Liability Suit Based on Section 402.4 ofthe Restatement of Torts Second (Can Oil and
Water Mix?), 42 INs. COtNS.L J. 39 (1975): Fischer. Products Liability - Applicability of Comparative
Negligence, 43 Mo. L. REV'. 431 (19781) Hoskins. Comparative Negligence in a Strict Product Liability
Action: Sun Valle
, 
Airlines Corp. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 14 IDAHO L. REV. 723 (1978); jensvold, A
Modern Approach to Loss Allocation Among Tort-frasors in Products Liability Cases, 58 MINN. L. REv. 723
(1974): Kroll, Intra-Industry Joint Liability: A New Era in Products Liability, INs. L. 1. 193 (1979);
Levine. Strict Products Liability and Comparative Negligence. The Collision of Fault and No-Fault, 14 SAN
DIEoO L. REv. 337 (1977); Nelson, Products Liability: New Directions and PracticalApproaches, 2 CORP.
L. Rev. 179 (1979); Pinto, Comparative Responsibility An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 45 INs. CoUsL
J. 115 (1978): Schwartz, Strict Liability and Comparative Negligence, 42 TENN. L. REv. 171 (1974);
Simmonett, Release ofJoint Tortfeasors: Use of the Pierringer Release in Minnesota, 3 Wm. MITCHELL L.
RFv.. 1 (1977); Twerski & Weinstein, A Critique of the Uniform Product Liability Law - A Rush to
Judgment, 28 DRAKE L. REv. 221 (1979): Note, Comparative Negligence in a Strict Product Liability Action,
14 IDAHO L. REV. 698 (1978): Note. Products Liability, Comparative Negligence, and the Allocation of
Damages Among Aultiple Defendants, 50 S. CAL.. L. REv. 73 (1976): Note, Reconciling Comparative
Negligence, Contribution, and.Joint and Several Liability, 34 WASH. & LEE. L. REv. 1159 (1977): Note. A
Reappraisalof Contributor
, 
Fault in Strict Liability Law, 2 Wm. MtTCHvi.i. L. REv. 235 (1976); Casenote,
9 'E,. TECH. L. REv. 701 (1978); Casenote, 44.1. AIR L. & CoM. 649 (1979).
87. 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). This case also made Wisconsin one of the first
.jurisdictions to adopt a form of Restatement 402A strict liability, and until recent years was cited
primarily for that reason. It was in dictum that the Dippel court said the comparative negligence
statute applied to strict product liability cases. Id. at-., 155 N.W.2d at 64-65.
88. Dippelv. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, __, 155 N.W.2d 55. 63 (1967). This seems to be the one
point upon which all jurisdictions that will compare non-strict liability fauh with strict liability fault
seem to agree. See, e.g., Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Stipp. 598. 602
(D. Idaho 1976) ("However, strict liability is not absolute liability because a manufacturer is not an
insurer or guarantor that no one will be injured in using his product."): Caterpillar Tractor Co. v.
Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 889 (Alas. 1979) ("First... strict products liability is not absolute liability
.... ); Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 684 (W.V. 1979) ("Rylands looks
only to the resulting harm and creats absolute liability on the part of the defendant and no negligence
or defect need be shown. The defendant is an insurer - a standard which the overwhelming majority
of courts refuses to impose on the manufacturer ofa product. ")
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negligence as a matter of law or negligence per se is involved. 89 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court, discussing Dippel in a later case, said:
[T]he effect of the adoption of the rule of strict liability
based on this negligence in effect shifts the burden of
proof from the plaintiff of proving specific acts of
negligence to the defendant to prove he was not negligent
in any respect.
Consequently, in Wisconsin where we have
comparative negligence, many defenses including
contributory negligence and unilateral assumption of risk
as a part of contributory negligence are available in
determining the apportionment of the negligence by the
manufacturer of the alleged defective product and the
negligent use made thereof by the consumer. Thus the
ordinary rules of causation and defense applicable to
negligence are available under our adoption of the
Restatement rule. If this were not so, this court would
have abolished the doctrine of comparative negligence
which in Dippel this court said it would not do .... 90
The Dippel court had explained its action in these words: "What we
mean is that a seller who meets the conditions of sec. 402A,
Restatement, Torts 2d, in Wisconsin is guilty of negligence as a
matter of law and such negligence is subject to the ordinary rules of
causation and the defense applicable to negligence. '" 91 Thus,
approximately two years before Minnesota adopted the Wisconsin
comparative negligence statute, 92 and six years before North
Dakota adopted the Minnesota version, 93 the Wisconsin court had
determined that the comparative negligence statute applied to a
negligence-strict liability fact situation.
It was not until ten years after Dippel, however, that the
Minnesota Supreme Court applied comparative negligence in a
strict liability situation. In an analysis similar to the North Dakota
Supreme Court's reasoning in Bartels, the Minnesota court stated
in Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc. :94
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Dippel... adopted
89. 155 N.W.2d at 64-65.
90. Powersv. Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc., 64Wis. 2d 532, 219 N.W.2d 393, 395(1974).
91. 155 N.W.2d at 66 (Hallows, J., concorring).
92. 1969.
93. 1973.
94. __Minn. __, 262 N.W.2d 377 (1977).
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a cause of action for strict liability in tort under
Restatement, Torts 2d, § 402A. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court further held that its comparative negligence statute
applied to such actions. . . . [W]e [have] held that our
adoption of the Wisconsin comparative negligence statute
presumed our adoption of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court's interpretations of the statute up to that point. We
therefore adopt the Wisconsin rule that the comparative
negligence statute applies to actions brought on a § 402A
theory. . . .95
Wisconsin has been criticized for having categorized 402A
liability as just another form of negligence, 9 8 and there is every in-
dication that the Busch court sought not to place Minnesota in the
Wisconsin camp on that point. After agreeing with the Wisconsin
court's conclusion that the shared comparative negligence statute
applied to 402A forms of liability, the Busch court turned sharply
toward interpreting Restatement 402A, a legal principle not
adopted from Wisconsin. 97 The Busch court agreed with the
Wisconsin court that reducing the elements of proof was an
important policy reason behind adoption of strict liability. 98 The
Minnesota court went on, however, to note that the real
importance of this reduction of the elements of proof is that it
fosters the twin policies of protecting the consumer while shifting
the risk of loss to distributors, two universally accepted policy bases
behind section 402A. 99 Thus, the Minnesota court determined that
section 402A liability has a culpability basis qualitatively different
from negligence, and strict product liability cannot be equated with
"negligence per se."
Further indication that the Busch court did not approve of the
Wisconsin "negligence per se" approach to 402A-negligence
comparison is found in the court's choice of terminology.
Notwithstanding the "comparative negligence" language found
throughout what was then Minnesota's comparative negligence
statute, the court preferred to refer to the concepts in other terms:
"[C]omparative negligence is a misnomer. . . .[T]he comparative
negligence statute becomes more than a comparative negligence or
even a comparative fault statute; it becomes a comparative cause
05. Btisch v. Busch Constr. Inc., __ Minn. _ 262 N.W.2d at 393.
96. Sec. .g.. Fischer. Products Liabiliy - Applicability of Comparative Neelience, 43 Mo. L. Rev.
431. 439-43 (1978).
97. - Minn. __. 262 N.W.2d at 393-94.
98. Id. at . 262 N.W.2d at 393.
99. Id. at __. 262 N.W.2d at 393-94.
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statute under which all independent and concurrent causes of' an
accident may be apportioned on a percentage basis. "100
The court further strayed from the Wisconsin approach by
refusing to be bound by the Wisconsin Supreme Court's analysis of
available defenses in products liability actions:
What types of conduct by a user should constitute the
kind of contributory fault which is to be compared with a
distributor's strict liability?... [A]ny solution to this issue
must be tailored to protect the consumer's reliance on the
product's safety. To insure protection of this interest, we
hold that a consumer's negligent failure to inspect a
product or to guard against defects is not a defense and
thus may not be compared with a distributor's strict
liability. All other types of consumer negligence, misuse,
or assumption of risk must be compared with the
distributor's strict liability under the statute. 101
The North Dakota court will not be bound by either Busch or
Dipple when it confronts the issues discussed therein. North Dakota
had adopted Minnesota's comparative negligence statute prior to
the Minnesota Court's decision in Busch. 102 Since the North
Dakota legislature adopted only the then existing Minnesota case law
when it adopted the Minnesota statute, the North Dakota court will
not have to explain away the Busch analysis if it decides to take a
different approach. It further appears that the court will not be tied
to Dippel, either. Although Dippel was included in the pre-existing
Wisconsin case law which the North Dakota legislature
incorporated when it adopted the Minnesota statute, the North
Dakota court had not at that time adopted section 402A. Moreover,
section 402A was adopted by the court. There exists no question of
judicial interpretation of legislative intent. The court is free to
develop section 402A in any way its sees fit.
100. Id. at 262 N.W.2d at 394 (itations omitted). This terminology fo,,fd its way into the
1978 amendment of Minnesota's comparative negligenc (now "faut") act (ee rupra note 59), and
is, ofcotirse, used thrmghoot the Uniform Comparative Fa.lt A(1.
101. Id. (citations omitted.)
102. The chronology is as follows:
1967 - Dippel was decided (Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55
(1967)).
1969 - Minnesota adopted Wisconsin comparative-negligence statute.
1973 - North Dakota adopted Wisconsin-Minnesota comparative-negligence
statute.
1977 - Busch was decided (Busch v. Bosch Constr., Inc., . Minn. __, 262
N.W.2d 377 (1977)).
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It therefore appears that North Dakota is in a good position to
take or leave any or all of the analysis in Busch and Dippel, and still
remain consistent with its approach in Bartels. The author suggests
that as a point of departure it would be wise to follow Minnesota's
lead on at least two points: removal of the "negligence" label when
the comparative statute is applied in strict liability situations, and
adoption of the Minnesota court's interpretation of comment n to
section 402A. That interpretation limits application of the ban
against cons'ideration of a consumer's contributory fault to situa-
tions involving failure to inspect or guard against defects.
Removal of the "negligence" label when applying the
comparative statute to strict liability would free the new concepts of
negligence trappings '0 3 and promote unimpeded growth of 402A as
a revolutionary tort theory. Moreover, this approach would give to
North Dakota the flexibility it will need to deal with the maze of
problems currently facing our courts which threaten to arrest
orderly development of this area of the law. 10 4
103. For a good review of negligence terminology and concepts in this context see Note, Strict
Products Liability: The Irrelevance of Foreseeability and Related Negh'ence Concepts, 14 TULSA L. J. 338
(1978). Unfortunately the author tried to do that which cannot be done - explain negligence
concepts. But then he is in good company. See Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E.
99 (1928) (Cardozo-Andrews debate) (discussed, 14 T'UlSA L.J. at 345-46).
104. Prior to the relatively recent comparative negligence-strict liability debate there was little
need to discuss the nature of the underlying theory of§ 402A liability. Ifthe plaintiff's condict was of
conseq,tence only in the relatively narrow "misuse" and "assumption of risk" context, such
conduct would bar all recovery and the distributor's liability simply no longer existed. When,
however, the relative fault of the plaintiff is compared with the distribttor's responsibility to market
a defect free product, the liability "basis" of that responsibility becomes relevant.
Three approaches seem to be emerging. The first is the neg'ligence per se approach of Dippel (See
also, Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676 (D.N.H. 1972)). Labeling § 402A
liability "negligence" focuses attention on the conduct of the distribitor, and because there is often
no condoct (except marketing) to focus on, this approach creates conceptual difficulties.
The second approach is a form of "implied warranty" divested of the contractual problems of
notice, privity, and disclaimer. This approach focuses on the defective nature of the product, which
is as difficult to compare with the consumer's negligence as is the non-existent conduct of the manl-
factirer. (See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1179, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 402 (1978)
(Jefferson j., concurring and dissenting).
The third approach simply refers to the manufacturer's conduct as a "cause" and comparative
causation, and while the debate is far from over, "[clomparative causation may prove to be the most
practical and workable solution to the comparison dilemma." Casenote, 441. Air L. & Com. 649
(1979).
As explained in General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977), in applying
the approach in a rather narrow "misuse" context:
[11f the product is found to have been unreasonably dangerous when the defendant
placed it in the stream of commerce, and if that defect is found to have been a
producing cause of the damaging event, and if the plaintiff.., mistsed the produhct...
and . . that misuse is a proximate cause of the damaging event, the trier of fact must
then determine the respective percentages (totaling 100%) by which these two con-
ciirring causes contribtited to bring about the event....
Id. at 352.
The Alaska court chooses not to follow the "comparative causation" approach, referring
instead to its newly created comparison device as a "comparative negligence defense." Buitatid v.
Suburban Marine & Sport. Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 46 (Alas. 1976).
We.find it unnecessary to conceptualize the theory of the action which strict liability creates in
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Adoption of Minnesota's interpretation of comment n to
section 402A is suggested because that interpretation removes a
maJor obstacle in the path of a logical formula for comparing
ordinary negligence with strict liability. Comment n provides:
n. Contributory negligence. Since the liability with which this
Section deals is not based upon negligence of the seller,
but is strict liability, the rule applied to strict liability
order for its to apply comparative negligence principles to strict products liability cases
which result in personal injuries....
Although it is theoretically difficult for the legal purist to balance the sellers
strict liability against the user's negligence, this problem is more apparent than real.
Id. at 45 (emphasis added).
The comparative negligence defense would be applied in the same manner as in any
negligence case, with the major difference being that in products liability cases it
would not be necessary to prove that a defect was caused by negligence.
Id. at 46 (emphasis added).
Justice Rabinowitz, concurring in Butaud, would have preferred "comparative causation:
I generally agree with the court's treatment of the issues which arise in the
situation where a plaintiffwho is himself negligent asserts a claim founded upon strict
liability. Perhaps it is only a semantic difference rather than reflective of a true
fiuctional distinction but I prefer adoption of a comparative causation analysis in
strict liability cases. Thus, I would require the trier of fact to compare the harm caused
by the product's defect with the harm caused by the claimant's own negligence ...
Adoption of a comparative causation approach would avoid the theoretical problems
inherent in any attempt to compare relative degrees of fault where the defendant's
negligence, or fault, is determined by principles of strict liability.
Id. at 47 (citations omitted) (Rabinowitz,J., concurring).
Is there more than a semantic difference? The majority explained how its comparative nqligence
defense works:
The defendant is strictly liable due to the existence of a defective condition in the
product. On the other hand, the plaintiff's liability attaches as a result of his conduct
in using the product. It is appropriate, therefore, that the parties' contribution to the
injury be apportioned. The defendant is strictly liable for the harm caused from his
defective product, except that the award of damages shall be reduced in proportion to
the plaintiff's contribution to his injury.
In breaking new ground in this area of the law, we feel that the public polic'
reasons for strict product liability do not seem to be incompatible with comparative
negligence. The manufacturer is still accountable for all the harm from a defective
product, except that part caused by the consumer's own conduct.
Id. at 45-47 (emphasis added).
Is the difference one of comparing the causes that brought about the event which in turn caused
the harm and apportioning the damages accordingly, as opposed to crediting the strictly liable party
with 100% of the responsibility for bringing about the event, and then reducing the total damages by
that percentage of fault attributable to the plaintiff's own harm producing conduct? And, if it is,
would it really make any practical difference which approach is used?
It is suggested that it would. Traditional tort law is better equipped to compare causes of an
event than it is to apportion damages caused by an event. It was, in fact, the difficulty in
apportioning damages between concurrent tortfeasors that gave rise to procedural devices that made
"joint tortfeasors" out of them. (See supra note 72 and accompanying text.) Through comparative
negligence, are we not simply adding the plaintiff's own conduct to the already existing concurrent
-uses? And is there anything about that cause that makes it easier to apportion damages?
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cases (see §524) applies. Contributory negligence of the
plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence consists
merely in a failure to discover the defect in the product, or
to guard against the possibility of its existence. On the
other hand, the form of contributory negligence which
consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to
encounter a known danger, and commonly passes under
the name of assumption of risk, is a defense under this
Section as in other cases of strict liability. If the user or
consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger,
and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of
the product and is injured by it, he is barred from
recovery. 105
What comment n was intended to do is not altogether clear.
The great majority of jurisdictions have extended the bar to include
contributory negligence in the general sense of a failure to exercise
ordinary care for one's own safety. It seems more logical to
conclude that what the drafters of section 402A meant to explain in
comment n was that "mere failure to discover the defect in the
product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence" is not
negligence at all. In other words, a reasonable and prudent person
would be justified in assuming the product was defect free, and
failure to look for a defect in every product is simply not negligence.
If it is remembered that the basis of 402A liability is a species of
warranty, and that in effect the product manufacturer is warranting
the product to be defect-free, it follows that a consumer may
reasonably expect that the product is in fact defect-free. Under this
view, reliance on the manufacturer's representation that the
product is safe would not be negligence.
A jurisdiction that has adopted section 402A would be
justified in ignoring comment n altogether. Minnesota almost did
so when it adopted only that part of comment n which met the
needs of Minnesota. 10 6 This approach clears the way for the
allocation of responsibility in an equitable manner. Simply stated,
it places the responsibility for manufacturing a defect-free product
on the manufacturer, and requires the consumer to exercise
ordinary care for his own safety when dealing with a product. 107
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A. Comment n (1965).
106. Busch v. Bosch Constr., Inc., __ Minn. __, 262 N.W.2d at 394 n.16. "Thits we adopt
Restatement, Torts 2d, § 402 (A), comment n only insofar as it removes the failre to inspect a
product as a defense." Id.
107. Given the contribution formola advanced by Bartels, adoption of the Busch approach wotld
also eliminate the need to resort to indemnity fictions to avoid holding a less-blameworthy distribtutor
of defective products and a more-blameworthy manufacturer equa!ly responsible for'the in.iries
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There are those who suggest the responsibility of the product
manufacturer is greater. The manufacturer, they say, is also the
proper agent for administering a no-fault insurance plan for injured
consumers. The proponents of that view overlook the fact that such
an approach is politically unacceptable. The executive and
legislative branches of our federal and state governments will
respond to the pressure of the business community lobby. 108
An acceptable solution for North Dakota might be to take the
Busch comparative approach even a step further to pure
comparative fault.' 09 Section 402A was judicially adopted by the
North Dakota Supreme Court and it is certainly within that court's
power to interpret the manner in which section 402A allocates
responsibility. 110
aised by those proclcts. One sbch fiction is the "active-passive" indemnity role. (See Skinner v.
Reed-Prentice Div., 70 111.2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977): Tolbert v. Gerber Indics., Inc., __
Minn.__, 255 N.W.2d 362 (1977).) Another is "partial indemnity. " (See Dole v. Dow Chemical
Co., 30 N.Y. 2d 143, 282 N.E. 2d 288, 331 N.Y.S. 2d 382 (1972)).
By comparing "all" cases of the iniutry, and then applying the Bartels pure comparison
approach to contribution, the reslt sho,dd be a straight-forward, understandable, and eqtitable
resolotion of a recurring prodicts liability litigation problem.
The resolution, of course, presupposes equitable treatment of each member of the business
omnumity vis-a'-vis all other members of that grouip and not merely the claimants. Clear
distinctions have to be drawn between the role of each participant, and liability should result only
when there can be attached to that role a dity over which that participant has a meastre of control.
As is demonstrated in the next section, the business community will not, and should not, tolerate
less.
108. If one is inclined to dotbt this concluision, consider the fact that consumer tax dollars
subsidize the tobacco industry, an industry producing probably the most defective and least
itilitarian prohict in America. Moreover, at this writing hindreds of legislative enactments favoring
inanuliacturers have either been passed by, or are pending before, the legislative bodies around the
contrv. The idiciary cannot much longer ignore the political realities of prodcts liability law.
109. The Bartels court seemed to favor a pure comparative fault approach. There are, for
example, several references to the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, a model law that is based upon a
pure approach. There is also the seemingly extraneouis reference in a footnote to California's ;udicial
adoption of pire comparative negligence: "The California court reached this conclusion on the basis
that cq,ity demands that the statute be construed in stich manner, and, more, that equity demands that
the pure form of comparative neitlgence be adopted. " 276 N.W.2d at 117 n.3 (empahsis added). Does this
language suggest that same conclusion? "North Dakota, in enacting its comparative negligence act
(§9-11)-07). . . in effect adopted the pure comparative negligence concept at least in instances
involving more than one tortfeasor." Id. at 121.
It is not onusal for the iidiciary to favor pore comparative negligence. Four states that have
adopted comparative negligence by judicial fiat chose the putre approach. (Alaska, Kaatz v. State,
540 P.2d 1037 (Alas. 1975); California, Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119
Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Florida, Hoffman v. jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Michigan, Placek v.
City ofSterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979)).
110. The policy considerations behind strict prodct liability Jistify application of pure
comparative negligence to products liability actions, notwithstanding the existence of a general
comparative negligence legislative enactment calling for a modified approach. A manuifacturer
should not escape liability simply because its defective prodcct was 50 percent or less responsible for
a clnsuumer's injuries. Moreover, the strict products liability action can be distinguished from other
kinds ofactions in that the transaction that resolts in injury to the product liability plaintiffdoes not
also result in inuury to the prodcet liability defendant, as is often the case in many other kinds of
faldt-based actions. It is not possible, for example, for a severely inucred 95 percent at fault party to
collect damages from a less severely inured 5 percent at fault party, while the less at fault party has to
bear the cost of his own injuries. (For example, assume the 95 percent at fault part' incorred
$751,000 in damages, while the 5 percent at falt party incrred $25,000 in damages. The 5 percent
at aoult party woucld not only have to bear the burden of his own loss, biot would also have to
contribule $13,750 toward the 95 percent at fault party's loss.) It is the possibility of this kind of
harsh resut that has given modified (49% and 50%) forms of comparative negligence their greatest
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If the North Dakota legislature wern. to adopt a pure
comparative fault system for all actions based upon fault liability,
the problem would, of course, resolve itself.111
III. POST-BARTELS: THE LEGISLATURE
When complex public policy concerns affect the law the
legislature is thought to be in a better position than the courts to
strike the proper balance among the competing interests. Although
Bartels is the foundation upon which future cases may build a new
body of tort law, the court system can only laboriously sand away at
society's friction points. By contrast, the legislative process is
theoretically geared to respond quickly and in sweeping fashion to
the most complicated combinations of issues. The legislature is,
after all, composed of representatives of all segments of society, and
through hearings, debate, deliberation, and collective impartial
judgment, equitable compromises are reached.
Equitable compromise is precisely the approach taken by the
Bartels court. Given time the court would resolve some of the
uncertainty that has fueled the rocketing products liability
insurance premiums. Compromises suggested in the preceding
section would likely reduce both the number and the size of awards,
leading ultimately to an end to the so-called products liability
crisis."
The North Dakota legislature has, however, decided not to
wait for the North Dakota Supreme Court to resolve the problem.
In 1977 the legislature appointed an interim committee to study
products liability concerns and formulate recommendations for
consideration during the 1979 legislative session. The
recommendations that resulted from the interim committee's two
year study came to the full legislature in the form of House Bill No.
1075.112 It does little for one's confidence in the objectivity of the
committee's study to learn that House Bill No. 1075 represents
nothing more than a slightly modified version of the Utah Product
Liability Act of 1977,1 3 an Act drafted and pushed through the
Utah legislature by the Utah Manufacturers' Association. t 4 That
appcal, III prodicts liab-ility c'-ascs the qy estion is always ont' of how intch of the damaged partics'
losses shouild be shared by (th non-datnaged parties. Ejoitii\ demands that the pre form of
comparative nc-gligcncc be' adol)ted, at least in+ prod'acts liMl)ility. actions.
111. So, note 148. inira.
112. Passed it) 1979 by the Forty-sixth Legislative Assemly of North Dakota (over Governor
Link's veto). Hoitsc Bill No. 107.5 is codified at N.D. CENT. Colork .28-01 .1 -11 through 05 (S.ipp.
1979).
113. 1977 Utah Laws 643 (codified at UTAH Cone Ax. § 78-15-1 through 6(1977)).
114. See Note, Tht Ultah Product Liabilitr Limitation of.4 tion an 'tfair Resolution of Complin
Conerniv, 1979 UT \H L. R:.. 149.
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association is made up of approximately 500 manufacturing
concerns organized to lobby on behalf of manufacturing
interests. 115 Given the proliferation of legislation proposed and
passed on the state and federal level, 116 it is doubtful that an act
designed to meet the needs of one of the most powerful lobbies in
the state of Utah is the best model legislation the interim committee
could have found. One is inclined to speculate that the same
interests that found success in Utah dictated the North Dakota
action. 7
A second products liability statute which wormed its way
through the 1979 legislature was House Bill No. 1589.118 That
effort had been proposed (apparently by retailers) to the interim
committee, had been wisely rejected by that committee, but then
astonishingly was resurrected and passed during the 1979 session.
The most constructive general comment that can be offered in favor
of House Bill No. 1589 is that it will likely do little damage because
it is probably unconstitutional. 119
Both Acts are designed to limit the liability of products liability
defendants. House Bill No. 1589 does so by placing the relatively
fault-free seller in what might best be described as a modified
''passive" posture under the "active-passive" indemnity fiction
which permitted indemnity if the negligence of the person seeking
indemnity was -passive" in contrast to the "active" negligence of
the other tortfeasor. 120 This fiction was rendered obsolete by the
Bartels relative fault standard. House Bill No. 1075 limits liability
15. Id. at 149 n.2.
116. See Birnbattn, Leeidative Reform or Retreat? A Responrie to the ProductV Liability Cri~iV, 14 FoRriM
251 (1978).
Most iorisdictions have now adopted some form of strict prei(hot liability. The
n,tmber ofprodct liability cases has proliferated ts the plaintiff's birdlen ofproofhas
lessened and the defendant's traditional common law definses hav( been abrogated.
As a resoIt of the soibstanial increase in the fr-i0 tnt yf prodti liability (asis, as well
as the size of settlements and awards, a so-called " risis" has ot'torr(i in Ihi field of
proditt liability. There have been Itw) maior respinsis to this tcrisis: a n, i tb r o)f
intensive stodies of the problem have been initiated both on the federal and state
levels; and legislation effecting changes in the (ratlitional tort litigation and insirancr
systems has been introd,-ed in Congress antI in many state ligislalores.
Id at 251-52 (footnotes omitted).
The U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Options Paper on Product Liability andAccident Compensation Issues, 43
Fed. Reg. 14613 (1978) notes that at its poblication date over 110 bills concerning prodct liability
were being considered in 42 states. A perisal of recent issoes of the Product Safety & Liability Reporter
would soggest that the trend is (ontinoing.
117. Based ipcon interviews with slate legislators and othis, the atthor is convinced that the
pro- prodiets liability law reform" forces have marshalled one tof the strongest lobbies ever to
descend ,ipon the North Dakota State Capitol.
118. House Bill No. 1589 is codified at N.D. CENT. (JoDE § 28-01.1-06 to07 (Supp. 1979).
119. This law cold be challenged on (lite process and e(i,al protection grot ns.
120. The "active-passiv'' indemnity fiction is discossed at supra note 107.
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by insulating the manufacturer from liability to the consumer, 121
thus focusing attention on the conduct of subsequent handlers of
the defective product. Each of these acts is discussed in more detail
below, but the introductory point to be made is that each act, by
singling out one group of defendants for special treatment, further
complicates the contribution and comparative causation
developments.
A. HousE BILL No. 1075
The stated purpose of House Bill No. 1075 is to encourage
insurance companies to continue to provide products liability
insurance. It attempts to do so by "limiting the time [within which
an action may be commenced against manufacturers] to a specific
period for which products liability insurance premiums can be
reasonably and accurately calculated.... 122 The main device for
accomplishing this goal is section 3 of the Act. 123 This section
provides:
Statute of limitation.
1. There shall be no recovery of damages for personal
injury, death, or damage to property caused by a
defective product unless the injury, death or damage
occurred within ten years of the date of initial
purchase for use or consumption, or within eleven
years of the date of manufacture of product, where
that action is based upon, or arises out of, any of the
following:
121. The Bill consists of a statute of limitations, an ad damn tm clause, an alteration defense, a
defect definition and a pres"mption against defects - possibly everything a non-resident
manuifacturer woild want covered in a North Dakota products liability act, but not much more.
If other members of the business commonity were duped into thinking that the drafters of this
legislation had them in mind, consider this language in section 2 of the Declaration of Legislative
Findings and Intent of the Bill: '3. It is the purpose of this Act to provide a reasonable time within
which actions may be commenced against manuifacturers .... - (codified at N.D. CENT. CoDE § 28-
01.1-01 (3) (Supp. 1979)). A Freudian slip? Consider the attention given to nomenclature in other
parts of the Bill: "If a manufacturer, wholesaler, or retailer issues a recall .... " (codified at N.D.
CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-02 (3) (Supp. 1979) (emphasis added)). "If a complaint filed. . . against a
manufacturer, wholesaler, or retailer .. . (codified at N.D. CENT. CODF § 28-01.1-03 (Supp. 1979)
(emphasis added)). "No manufacturer or seller .. . (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-04
(Stipp. 1979) (emphasis added)). Compare with Hotse Bill No. 1589: -1. 'Man,'fact,,rer' means a
person or entity who designs. .. 2. 'Produict liability action' means any action broight against a
manfacturer or seller of a product . ... 3. 'Seller' means any individtal or entity. inclding a
manufacturer, wholesaler, distributor, or retailer .. Codified at N.D. CFNT. CODF § 28-01.1-06
(Supp. 1979) (emphasis added).
122. Codified at N.D. CENT. CoDE § 28-01.1-01 (3) (Supp. 1979).
123. Id. at § 28-01.1-02.
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a. Breach of any implied warranties.
b. Defects in design, inspection, testing, or man-
ufacture.
c. Failure to warn.
d. Failure to properly instruct in the use of a pro-
duct.
2. The provisions of this section shall apply to all
persons, regardless of minority or other legal
disability, but shall not apply to any cause of action
where the personal injury, death, or damage to
property occurs within two years afterJuly 1, 1979.
3. If a manufacturer, wholesaler, or retailer issues a
recall of a product in any state, modifies a product, or
becomes aware of any defect in a product at any time,
and fails to notify or warn a user of the product who is
subsequently injured or damaged as a result of the
defect, the provisions of subsection 1 shall not bar any
action against the manufacturer, wholesaler, or
retailer based upon, or arising out of, the defect.
24
The time limitations imposed by House Bill 1075 are longer
than those provided in most other states. Because it appears that
few products liability actions are baded upon injuries caused by
products sold more than six years before an injury occurs,125 it is
probable that few meritorious product liability actions will be
barred by House Bill 1075. Some meritorious claims will be barred
by the Act, however, which raises the following constitutional issue.
124. Id.
125. See U.P.L.L analysis supra note 2, § 109 which states as follows:
The limited available data show that the concern aboot older prodicts may be
exaggerated. See ISO. "Closed Claim Survey," at 105-108 (indicating that over 97
percent of prodict-related accidents occur within six years of the time the product was
purchased and in the captive goods area 83.5 percent of all bodily injury accidents
have occurred within ten years ofmanfacture).
Id. at 3 0 0 9 .
These statistics are at best an educated guess. Only the insurance industry has control over the data
upon which that guess is based. The North Dakota Legislative Council noted the paucity of reliable
insurance claims data in its report. REPORT OFTHE NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE COUNCI, 139 (1979).
In response to the Insurance Commissioner's testimony before the Committee on Products Liability,
the Council noted: [Hlis office lacked information concerning products liability insurance experience
for two reasons. The Insurance Services Office (ISO), which prepares rate filings for a number of in-
surers, does not list the names of insurance companies for which they file rates, and those companies
who do list directly with the state do not list products liability insurance as a line item in their rate
filings or annual reports. ...
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1. Is there a sufficiently close correspondence between the
statutory classification and legislative goals of the House Bill 1075 so as not to
violate the equal protection requirements of the state andfederal constitutions?
The legislative goal can be summarized as one of enticing
insurance companies to continue to provide affordable products
liability insurance coverage to manufacturers. Sacrificing the
meritorious claims of a few North Dakota residents, however, will
not achieve that goal. It is doubtful that the losses suffered by
instirance companies from injuries caused by relatively old
prodtcts in this state are statistically significant. The author has
reviewed the legislative history of House Bill 1075, and has failed to
find evidence considered by the interim committee which would
lead to the conclusion that such a sacrifice would achieve the
desired effect. 12 6 Furthermore, there is reason to doubt that barring
the claims of all persons who are injured by defective products in
the state of North Dakota could achieve that goal. Certainly the loss
incidence experienced in North Dakota by such companies as Ford
Motor Company, General Motors, and International Harvester, to
name a few, would not significantly affect the cost or availability of
products liability insurance. North Dakota has a population no
larger than that of many medium size cities. Given the world-wide
exposure of the major manufacturing companies, who stand to
benefit little at such great cost to a few,' 27 it is unlikely that the
"close correspondence" between the "legislative goals" and the
''statutory classifications" can be shown. 1 2 8 It is, of course, possible
rals, and those companies vwho do list literctly with the state do not list pirolcits
ia!ilitv insoanc as a line itcn in heiir raw filings oi ann,al i-cp 'its....
/d. at 138.
The Commiteec on Pr-odorts Liabilitv iecomnmended Hotsc Bill No. 1076. which was also
passed Iy the legislatire in 1979.
This Bill irte riics insorance companies thar sell pri-odits lia ility insorancc in
North Dakota to report cei'min infoniration to ic Ormnissionerr of Ils, irance.
Iisorcrs wotild be ie( 1ired to -eporit the total nmnbei of prodots lialility claims, the
Ioal ainnmn0 paid in setllement or discharge of claiis, the total arnoon of preinirnis
paid for prodouts liability insirance. the total nombcr of pcr sons insored, the total
0mber of persons whose" insorance was canceled or nor renewed. and the reasons
rhcrefor. Only information relating to priodos liabilit expercience in North Dakota
wo,,d le req,,ired to be rilpor'd.
Id. at 140.
If the North Dakota Legislarore had no information ,pon which it comd base its own
conchosions . (oire ohsiosly the Lcgislatnre simply took the insioane indostr's word that a
prohlem exists. The instrance indtistr can hardly be considered an nbiased sottrice.
126. See REPORT OF THE NORTH DAKOTA LEGISiLATIVE COUNCIL 137-40(1979).
127. See note 132, infra
128. The test applied by the North Dakota Supreme Court in determining that the Medical
Malpractice Act was unconstitutional was the "close correspondence between statutory classification
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that the manufacturers established the "close correspondence" in
the evidence they presented to the Utah legislature before bringing
their road-show to North Dakota, but the record is void of any
convincing evidence presented to the North Dakota lawmakers.
Then who might benefit from this special classification?
Conceivably the manufacturer of products for exclusive
distribution and use in the state of North Dakota might. 129 Is there,
however, a product manufacturer in the state who can guarantee
that its product will not find its way to some other state, and there
cause an injury?130 Only if a manufacturer could show that liability
for injuries caused by its products would be determined exclusively
by North Dakota law would there be a close "correspondence"
between a law that provides for a preferred class of defendants and
the "legislative goal" of reducing insurance premiums. The
question remains, however, if there are such manufacturers in the
state, are there enough to justify the sacrifice to be made by all
and legislativc goals" test. Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 133 (N.D. 1978). That test, the
coort said, chsely approximates the substantive (hc-process test. Id.
The Proditcts Liability Committee had considered the cpiestion of whether parts of the North
Dakota Proucits l.iability Act were tinconstitttional. One of the members of the Committee sotught
and obtained an opinion from the North Dakota Attorney General's Office qpestioning the
(onstitutionality of the statute of limitations provision. An Assistant Attorney General suggested the
provision was ,tnconstittitional, bit that the Medical Malpractice Act contaned a similar provision
which had not at that time been considered by the North Dakota Supreme Cort. (See letter from
Robert P. Brady, Assistant Attorney General, to State Representative Wayne K. Steneh em (Jan.
11, 1978)), On Allgst 11, 1978, the North Dakota Supreme Coort declared the Medical
Malpractice Act to be unconstitutional in Arueson, 270 NJW.2d at 138. Months later the legislature
( onsidered and passed the Produicts Liability Act (House Bill 1075) notwithstanding the fact that the
Sopreme Court's action in Ameson made the Act constitutionally suspect.
129. Certainly a toanktfactirer like Clark-Melroe cotld not. If a defectively manttfactured
Clark-Melroe prodcct injures a North Dakota farmer, Hotuse Bill 1075 is designed to reduce his
chances of recovery. Given the world-wide distribution of Clark-Melroe products, as well as the
possibility that a Clark-Melroe produtct initially sold in North Dakota will find its way out of state, is
there really any likelihood that the sacrifice made by North Dakota farmers will ha ve a significant
effect 1 Clark-Melroe's products liability instrance?
If reducing a North Dakota farmer's chances of recovery has a positive effect on Clark-Melroe's
instrance rates, the fact that other cohntries are passing laws that will make it easier for their citizens
to recover from Clark-Melroe will more than off-set that effect. The nine member countries of the
Ftrotpean Economic Community will likely incorporate strict liability into their national laws in the
%ery near future. Moreover, the language of the proposed law should be cause for concern by
Americans. Consider this quote:
Americans Beware
What makes the proposed EEC directive so threatening... is Article I of the
dciient which provides that a prodict manufacttrer cotld be held strictly liable not
only "whether or not he knew or could have known" of a defect in its prodttct, btit also
"if'the article could not have been regarded as defective in the light of the scientific
and technical developments at the time when he put the article into circulation.'"
This language, in view of European industry, stibects the mantfacturer to
absolutte liability for in uries linked to its product....
7 Pio,) SA. & LIAu. REP. (BNA) 316 (1979).
130. Would a builder involved in the mass production and sale of homes be stch a
mandhtc'urer? (See Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (.1965)). Even if it
woll, is there a North Dakota btilder engaged in the "mass production" ofhomes?
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North Dakota consumers?' 3' The author found no evidence
considered by the lawmakers that would justify their conclusion
that there are such manufacturers in the state, or, if there are, that
insurance companies are prepared to underwrite special products
liability insurance at reduced prices for them.
2. What kinds of claims are barred by 1075, and against
whom?
The language of 1075 appears to limit its application to claims
arising out of the manufacturing process. 132 There is little evidence
to suggest that the drafters of 1075 had any other situations in
mind. 33 By listing only four possible liability-producing acts,
however, it is possible that others have been excluded, especially
those that would result in liability to products liability defendants
other than the manufacturers. Even as to manufacturers, however,
not all claims are barred. Furthermore, by including "breach of
any implied warranties" as a liability-producing act covered by the
131. A state that underwrites insurance for losses sufiered by its residents involved in accidents
with uninsured motorists (see N.D. CENT. ConE l CH. 39-17 (1976)) might consider underwriting
insurance for those few North Dakota manufacturers that might be subject to suit exclusively by
North Dakota residents.
132. As this article is readied for publication a newspaper reports a New York Jury has awarded
$500,000 to tite daughter tfa woman who had taken DES in 1953. Some 19 years after the mother
had taken the drug the daughter developed cancer. Houston Post, Jtly 22, 1979, at 2A. The action
was aplarently brought against the manufacturer of the drug on an "intra-industry oint liability'
theory (for a discussion of this approach, see Kroll, Intra-Industry Joint Liability. A Vew Era in Products
Liabiity. Ins. LJ 193 (1975)), and could result in many sutits by the estimated 500,000 to 2,000,000
sons and daughters of DES users. many, of whom have cancer. and many more of whom have a
disease called adenosis. Houston Post, Joly 22, 1979, at 2A. If they happen to live in North Dakota,
hov.eser. it appears that their claitos s'ill be barred.
It is naive tosuggest that forcing the North Dakota victims to bear the cost oftheir own injuries
w.ill aflect insurance rates. Moreover, is it suggested that if it did affect rates, the drug companies
wsoold pass ttat satings i on ls tot North Dakota users of their procficts?
(onsider this hypothetical. A two year old North Dakota child is burned when the gas tank on a
Pito explodes. Onl the samte dai at California child is burned tnder simtlar circumstances. Assume
te stttte of limitations in House Bill 1075 bars the North Dakota child's action, but the more
conventional Califo rnia statute of linitations does not bar the California child's action. Assume
clatniages of' 1.500.000 b'each child. It is possible that future North Dakota owners of Pintos would
pit less for their Pintos than future California owners, btft how to ch less? $100? At that rate Ford
would have to sell 15.000 Pintos in North Dakota and guarantee to its insurer that none of the Pintos
would be used ott non-Nnrth Dakota highwtys. What is more likclv is that the savings to Ford's
insr'ance carrier caused by barring the North Dakota child's sittl wold restiIt in the saving of a fes'
cetits by all future purchasers of Pintos in all states.
133. (ompare tile description of claiis foud in 1075 vs'ith those fond in the U.P.L.L.:
Prott t liability cla in incltdes all claiis or actions brotight for personal inJitry.
death or property damage caused b' the manlltfacttre, c'ottstrction, design, fornilta.
preparation, assembly. installation, testing. warnings. instrictions. marketing.
packaging. or labeling of ans prdtuct. It includes. btt is not limited to. all actions
based ot the tfollosw ing theories: strict liabilit in tort: nc,0rt/e cc," breach ofi'arranrt cpress or
impld: bieath or fai/re to dishar,(,c a dat to warn or instruct. u/cthrer i g/hittnt or innocent:
tisr'rcsentation. t ah 'ona e-tt or nindt'clostur'. i'h/tt'r ne'4',o''tt or intno nt. or undr antr othcr
substanti v , e al thcorr in tort or contract.
U. P.I.. L. supra note 2 § 102(2) (emphasis added).
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bill, it is probable that the implied warranties contained in the
Uniform Commercial Code are affected by the statute of
limitations provisions. This would obviously have the effect of
extending the statute of limitations period applicable to Uniform
Commercial Code implied warranties from four years 134 to ten or
eleven years, thereby affording manufacturers less protection than
they previously had.
If it is unclear which claims against manufacturers are barred,
the extent of protection afforded to downstream sellers is even less
certain. Are there not acts that occur and duties that arise after the
manufacture or initial sale of the product which trigger claims
based upon negligence, the Uniform Commercial Code, or
governmental regulations, to list a few? And will those downstream
defendants be entitled to look back up the stream for indemnity or
contribution from the wrongdoer whose act of producing a
defective product was the primary cause of the resulting injuries?
Two things do seem clear. First, House Bill 1075 will not be
nearly as effective at insulating manufacturers from liability as its
drafters intended. Second, in the few situations in which the
manufacturer's liability has been limited, it will probably be at the
expense of the downstream defendants. The identity of these
alternate defendants should be disturbing to the guardians of the
North Dakota public interest. Those defendants will be their
friends and neighbors, fellow North Dakota residents to whom
other North Dakota residents will increasingly be forced to look for
compensation for injuries caused by, among others, Detroit
manufacturers. Adding insult to injury, all North Dakota residents
will continue to pay the cost of the premiums paid by Detroit
manufacturers for products liability insurance.
3. Will the claimant who discovers, or should have dis-
covered, an injury during the first few years after manufacture or sale of a
product have more time within which to bring an action than he had under
previous law?
There is nothing in 1075 which requires a claimant to
commence an action within a given time after the injury is
discovered, 35  which leads one to conclude that no such
134. U.C.C. 2-725.
135. Sich a requirement is provided for in the U.P.I.L.: "All claims tnder this Act shall he
brought within three years of the time the claimant discovered, or in the exercise of die diligence
shotld have discovered, the facts giving rise to the claim." U.P.L.L. supra note 2 § 109 (c).
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requirement exists. 136 The only time-triggering events are the
manufacture and sale of the product. Thus, it would seem that a
claimant injured during the first year after initial purchase would
have nearly ten years in which to commence an action, one injured
during the second year nearly nine years, and so on. Because the
majority of injuries seem to occur shortly after purchase, it would
appear that the actuary projecting premiums will be faced with
additional variables, all leading to increased exposure to liability.
4. Does House Bill 1075 violate the North Dakota
constitutional provision related tojudicial power?
Section 87 of the North Dakota Constitution provides in part:
"The supreme court shall have authority to promulgate rules of
procedure, including appellate procedure, to be followed by all
courts of this state.... ''137
Since "procedure" includes pleading and evidentiary
matters, 138 it would appear that portions of House Bill 1075 are in
violation of section 87 of the North Dakota Constitution in at least
two respects. Section 4 of House Bill 1075 purports to promulgate a
new procedural rule for the form and content of a pleading, which
would clearly violate Section 87 of the Constitution. Section 4 states
as follows:
If a complaint filed in a products liability action against a
manufacturer, wholesaler, or retailer prays for a recovery
of money in an amount equal to or less than fifty
thousand dollars, the amount shall be stated. If a recovery
of money in an amount greater than fifty thousand dollars
is demanded, the pleading shall state merely that recovery
of reasonable damages in an amount greater than fifty
136. The old statute of limitation provides for a six year period within which the action must
commence after the claim accrues. The claim accrues when the product causes an inijiry and that
inlury is discovered or should have been discovered. N.D. CENT. COOE 5 28-01-16 (1974). The
sponsors of House Bill 1075 assumed the old statute of limitations would continue to apply (see
REPORT OF THE NORTH DAKOTA LEc.tSLATIVE COUNCIL 139 (1979)), but that conclusion does not
necessarily follow from a reading of House Bill 1075. It is likely that the drafters had in mind
superimposing a statute of repose, but it would seem that if that was their intent they wotld have
labeled it accordingly. Moreover, if they intended to have both statuttes apply they shoild have noted
that fact in House Bill 1075.
A statute of repose differs from a statute of limitations in that a statwte of repose sets a fixed limit
after the time of the wrongful conduct, rather than a fixed time limit after the discovery of the injiury.
The product seller will not be liable after this time limit has run, regardless of when the inlury occturs.
The U.P.L.L. has both a statite of repose and a stattte of limitations. See U.P.I..L. supra note 2 %
109B and 109C.
137. N.D. CONST. art. 4, § 87 (1889, amended 1976). See also Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d
125 at 131.
138. SeeArneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d at 131.
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thousand dollars is demanded. This section may be
superseded by an amendment to the rules of civil
procedure adopted afterJuly 1, 1979.139
The second section that seems in clear violation of section 87 of the
constitution is section 6 of 1075. The offending portion of that
section is subsection 3:
There is a rebuttable presumption that a product is free
from any defect or defective condition where the alleged
defect in the plans or designs for the product or the
methods and techniques of manufacturing, inspecting,
and testing the product were in conformity with
government standards established for that industry which
were in existence at the time the plans or designs for the
product or the methods and techniques of manufacturing,
inspecting, and testing the product were adopted. 14 0
Because House Bill 1075 purports to promulgate rules of pleading
and evidence, it probably is unconstitutional under the North
Dakota Constitution.
5. Does House Bill No. 1075 violate sections 69 and 70 of
the North Dakota Constitution?
Section 69 of the North Dakota Constitution provides in part:
"The legislative assembly shall not pass local or special laws in
any of the following enumerated cases...: 10. [f]or limitation of
civil actions.... ; 24. [a]ffecting estates of deceased persons, minors
or others under legal disabilities.' '141
Section 70 of the North Dakota Constitution provides in part:
"In all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, no
special law shall be enacted; nor shall the legislative assembly
indirectly enact such special or local law by the partial repeal of a
general law."' 142
A special law has been defined by the North Dakota Supreme
Court as "one which relates only to particular persons or things of a
class, as distinguished from a 'general law,' which applies to all
things or persons of a class. ,43 House Bill No. 1075 seems clearly
139. Codified at N.D. CENT. Coop. § 28-01.1-03 (Stpp. 1979).
140. Id. at § 28-01.1-05 (3).
141. N.D. CONST. art. 2, §69.
142. N.D. CONST. art. 2, $ 70.
143. See State v. Lawler, 53 N.D. 278, 287, 205 N.W. 880, 883 (1925).
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to fall into the classification "special legislation." It purports to
place products liability defendants in an advantageous position
when compared with other tort defendants, and it purports to place
products liability plaintiffs at a correspondent disadvantage, when
compared with the rights of other tort plaintiffs. In that regard 1075
is very much like the Medical Malpractice Act, which the North
Dakota Supreme Court apparently was prepared to declare
unconstitutional as a violation of sections 69 and 70 of the state
constitution, if it had not already done so on other grounds. 144
6. General observations about House Bill No. 1075
There is little to commend in 1075. Among other concerns, the
Act was poorly drafted. It is replete with ambiguities, certain to
invite litigation on questions other than its constitutionality.1 45
Moreover, the Act is as inadequate for what it does not cover as it is
for the incomplete manner in which it purports to protect the
interests of manufacturers. An analysis of what it should have
covered to justify being labeled the "North Dakota Products
Liability Act" is beyond the scope of this article.14 6 It is likely the
North Dakota legislature will see how defective their 1979 product
is and will repeal it at the first opportunity. In the meantime,
House Bill No. 1075 will certainly complicate the orderly resolution
of the complex multi-defendant issues certain to confront the North
Dakota Supreme Court in the near future.
144. See Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d at 136-37, discussed supra note 137.
145. There is, for example. the matter of the definition of'defect" toond in Section 6 of 1075:
I. No prodict shall he considered to have a defect or to be in a defective
condition, unless at the time the produsct was sold by the manufacturer or other initial
seller, there was a defect or defctive condition in the product which made the product
unreasonably dangerous to the user or constilner.
2. As used in this Act, "unreasonably dangerous" means that the product was
dangerous to an extent beyond which would be contemplated by the ordinary and
prudent buyer, consumer, or user of that product in that community considering the
product's characteristics, propensities, risks, dangers, and uses, together with any actual
knowledge, training, or experience possessed by that particular huyer, user, or consumer.
Codified at N.D. C ENT. CoDE 5 28-01.1-05 (1) (2) (Supp. 1979).
Even if we assume that the language "that particular buyer, user, or consumer'" refers to a person other
than the "ordinary and prudent buyer, consumer, or user ofthat product, " it is difficult to imagine how the
addition of this subjective element could lead to a functional test. Certainly it adds nothing con-
structive to the debate over what a definition of "defect" should contain. (See e.,g., Caterpillar Trac-
tor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 876-87 (Alas. 1979): Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co.. 253
S.E.2d 666, 680-83 (W.Va. 1979)).
If the reader is still in doubt about whether 1075 should be reconsidered in its entirety, consider
this sentence from section 5 which states that "[nio manufacturer or seller. . shall be held liable...
as a result of. . . failure to properly instruct in the.. misuse of that product.'" Codified at N.D.
CENT. Cooy § 28-01.1-04 (Suipp. 1979).
146. For a discussion of matters that should be included in such an act, seeTwerski & Weinstein,
A Critiqueofthe Uniform Product Liability Law -A Rush tojuemnent, 28 DRAKE L. REv. 221 (1979).
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B. HOUSE BILL No. 1589
The second major products liability Act to be passed by the
1979 North Dakota legislature was House Bill No. 1589. That bill
purports to provide for indemnification of a retailer by the
manufacturer of an allegedly defective product. In relevant part,
the Bill provides the following at section 2:
If a product liability action is commenced against a seller,
and it is alleged that a product was defectively designed,
contained defectively manufactured parts, had
insufficient safety guards, or had inaccurate or
insufficient warnings; that such condition existed when
the product left the control of the manufacturer; that the
seller has not substantially altered the product; and that
the defective condition or lack of safety guards or
adequate warnings caused the injury or damage
complained of; the manufacturer from whom the product
was acquired by the seller shall be required to assume the
cost of defense of the action, and any liability that may be
imposed on the seller. 14 1
One wonders how the drafters of House Bill No. 1589.
expected the Bill to achieve their goals of requiring a manufacturer
to assume the cost of defending products liability actions, and then
indemnify the seller should the manufacturer's defense be
unsuccessful. The Bill is ambiguous in a number of ways. For
example, section 2 suggests that the manufacturer has an obligation
to assume the defense of an action commenced against the seller. It
is far from clear, however, how or when that obligation arises. The
obligation appears to somehow be connected with certain
allegations contained in a pleading, but whose pleadings? What,.
happens if the allegations called for are not made? And who makes
them? It seems unlikely that in the absence of collusion the plaintiff
would allege that "the seller has not substantially altered the
product." Does this mean that the seller must file a responsive
pleading for the purpose of getting that allegation on the record
before the manufacturer has an obligation to assume the cost of the
defense? At what stage does the manufacturer assume the cost of
the defense? Does "cost of the defense" include conducting the
defense? What is included in the "cost of defense?" How, when,
147. Coditied at N.D. CENT. COOE 28-01.1-07 (1979)
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and by whom are all of these matters to be determined?
A seller inclined to assert any assumed rights under House Bill
1589 will undoubtedly be disappointed. The Bill's deficiencies are
too obvious to require further discussion. This is not to suggest the
author is unsympathetic with the objectives of its drafters. Except
for a few major chain stores, North Dakota retailers should not
have been included as strictly liable defendants under 402A. Small
retailers are in no better position to "spread the risk" of the
consuming public's losses than are consumers. Many can afford
neither the cost of product liability insurance nor the cost of
defending a claim filed against them. Moreover, the consuming
public's insatiable appetite for more and more at affordable prices
is as much to blame for the proliferation of defectively produced
products as the manufacturer's hunger for profit. Caught in the
middle is the small retailer (by far the majority in a rural state)
whose very existence depends upon the fickle whims of the
consumer on the one hand and the productive ingenuity of the
manufacturer on the other. These sellers do little to create demand
for products; they merely try to survive by attempting to meet that
demand. Unless some fault basis attributable to the seller other
than strict products liability exists, the seller should not be a party
to a product liability action in North Dakota.148
IV. CONCLUSION
These are turbulent times for torts. Each term of court and
each legislative session can be expected to reverse decades of legal
and legislative precedent. A glimpse at what has been happening in
just a few areas has been provided in these pages. To ask that one
predict where it is all going is to ask the impossible.
148. Other states have limited the liability of sellers. Nebraska, for example, does not allow a
strict liability action to be cotmmsenced against a seller oi lessor who is not also the manufacturer of
the defective product, NEB. L.B. 665 § 3 (1978), and Tennessee statuite provides that a product
liabilitv act iot tllav isot be nolt toeneed against a seller when the prodtict is sold in a sealed container
and th e seller lack s a reasonable opportnitv to inspect the pruict in a manner which wouild, or
shilid in the exercise of reasonable care. reveal the existence of the defective prodtict. 'ENN. CODE
ANN. § 23-3706 (1979).
The U.P.L.L. also makes a distinction between the liability ofa manufacturer and that of other
prod ict sellers at section 114 which provides as follows:
(t) NIantl.Ltirers shall be responsible flor defective conditions in their prod icts
according to the provisions of this Act. In the absence of' express warranties to the
Contrary,. other proditel sellers slhall not be subject to liability in circimstaces where
they do not thave a reasonable opporti nits to inspect tihe prod ct in a manner wich
wisuld or should, in tile exercise of reasonable care. reveal the existence of the defective
eon( ition.
(b) 'Ile dsity liiiitation o i stibsection (a) shall io apply. however, if:
(I) The iianiiliicttrer is not subject to service of process in the clainant's
in is state:
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One can, however, suggest an approach for North Dakota:
enter the turbulent waters cautiously, and then only when they
have been tested and charted by others. There is little that a state
with a population no larger than that of a medium-sized United
States city can do to affect trends having world-wide ramifications.
In the meantime, the Bartels relative fault approach, if allowed
to develop without undue legislative interference, will strike an
acceptable balance. Co-operation from and with the legislature, of
course, is imperative. North Dakota might consider following
Minnesota's lead in updating its "comparative fault" statute,
although this might well be the time for North Dakota to join those
jurisdictions embracing "pure comparative fault." The Bartels
analysis would seem to point in that direction.
Above all, this does not seem to be the time to impose upon the
tort system preferred classes of defendants. Rather, the goal should
be one of striving for a system that treats all claimants and all
tortfeasors equitably. If there was ever a time in which the one
word was "compromise," this is it.
(2) The manufacturer has been udicially dcilared insolvent;
(3) The court determines that the claimant would have appreciable
difficflty enforcing a judgment against the product mantifa iurer.
U.P. L.L.., supra note 2 § 114.
An interim committee currently has tinder study the North Dakota comparative negligence law.
Its charge is to bring recommendations to the 1981 session of the North Dakota legislature. The
importance of the comparative negligence law to all areas of law disc ssed in this article cannot be
overstated. Every member of the North Dakota legal profission should follow the work of, and give
g,uidance to, that committee. North Dakota tort law cannot absorb another bill like 1075.
